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COMMERCE CLAUSE IMPLICATIONS OF
MASSACHUSETTS' ATTEMPT TO LIMIT
THE IMPORTATION OF "DIRTY" POWER
IN THE LOOMING COMPETITIVE
RETAIL MARKET FOR ELECTRICITY
GENERATION
L INTRODUCTION
On January 1, 1998, Massachusetts plans to allow all of its citizens
to shop for their own suppliers of electricity in an open and competi-
tive retail market.' Many other states across the nation also are plan-
ning to implement competitive retail markets for electricity.' This mas-
sive restructuring of the 200 billion dollar electricity utility industry,
which is larger than both the automobile industry and the television
industry, is the culmination of a complex combination of technologi-
cal, economic and regulatory developments over the past few decades.'
The proponents of the restructuring plan predict that the creation of
a competitive retail market for electricity will provide a tremendous
I See generally Commonwealth of Massachusetts Dep't of Pub. Utils., Electric Industry Restruc-
turing Plan: Model Rules and Legislation Proposal, DPU 96- IOU (Dec. 30, 1996) [hereinafter DPU
96- 100]; NEES, Mews. AG Competition Pact Gains Support Due to Emissions Provision, U• IL. ENV'T
REP., Sept. 27, 1996, at 6 [hereinafter NEES, Mass. AG Competition Pact]; NEES, Mass. AG Seek
Industry Support Jr Restructure Plan to Begin in '98, N.E. POWF,R REP., Sept. 27., 1996, at 9
[hereinafter NEES, Mass. AG Seek Industry Support]; News Release from the Office of the Attorney
General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Harshbarger Unveils Electric Restructuring Plan: Mas-
sachusetts Electric is First Utility to Sign On, at 1 (Sept. 12, 1996) [hereinafter Harshbarger Unveils!.
2 See Arden Dale, Power Surge: Deregulation Turns Electric Industry Upside Down, Dow,JoN es
NEWS Scirvicte„ March 24, 1997, available in WEs'itAw; Joseph Greenwald, Power to the People:
Deregulation is Shaking up the Utility Industry. Expect Cheaper Electricity and Mare Confusion, TimE,
Mar. 10, 1997, at 53 [hereinafter Power to the Profile]; William H. Miller, Electrifying Momentum,
INDUSTRY WK., Feb, 17, 1997, at 69.
3 See generally Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities: Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and
Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,510 (1996) [hereinafter' Order No. 888]; Open Access
Same-Time Information System and Standards of' Conduct, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,737 (1996) [herein-
after Order No, 8H9]; B. Jeanine Hull et al., Submitted Committee Report: Report of the Committee
on Independent Power Production 1995-1996, 17 ENERGY L.J. 503, 513 (1996); Peter Navarro, A
Guidebook and Research Agenda for Restructuring the. Electricity bitingly, 16 ENERGY U. 347, 349-55
(1995); Elisabeth Pendley, Deregulation of the Energy Industry, 3l 1-Arso & WATER L. Rtiv. 27, 61
(1996); Greenwald, supra note 2, at 53.
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benefit for consumers, resulting in savings of between 80 billion and
100 billion dollars annually. 4
Although the retail price of electricity may decrease, however, the
restructuring initiative also threatens to impose potentially disastrous
economic, health and environmental effects on areas of the United
States that are the unwilling recipients of air pollution from neighbor-
ing regions. 5 In particular, the creation of a competitive retail market
for electricity will likely place Northeastern electricity producers at a
severe competitive disadvantage compared to low-cost, coal-fired plants
in the Midwest, which probably will dramatically increase production
to expand their market share." In turn, it is feared that the resulting
increased emissions of particulates, ozone and other pollution in the
Midwest will travel to the Northeast.? Thus, the residents and environ-
4
 See Plarshbarger Unveils, supra note 1, at 1-2; Miller, supra note 2, at 69.
5 See Dr. Richard Rosen et al., Promoting Environmental Quality in a Restructured Electric
Industry 15-16 (Dec. 15, 1995) (unpublished report prepared by the Tellus Institute for The
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners, on tile with the author). The report
indicates that several regions of the country are subjected to the long-range transport of air
pollutants. See id. Pollutants travel from the Midwest to the Northeast, from the Ohio Valley and
the Inner Southeast to the Southern Appalachian Mountains and from the Los Angeles Basin to
the Colorado Plateau. See DOE Public Meeting Signals Pollution Transport as Prime Legislative Goal,
UTIL. ENV'T Rio'., Oct. 25, 1996, at 5; Mass. Eyeing "Ticket to Play" System for Out-of-State Power
Producers, Urn.. ENV'T REP., Nov. 8, 1996, at 7 [hereinafter Mass. Eyeing "Ticket to Play"];
Nescaum: Ozone is Blowin' in the Wind, ELEC. DAILY, Mar. 14, 1997, at I; Vermont's Draft Compe-
tition Strategy, UHL. ENV'T REP., Oct. 25, 1996, at 4 [hereinafter Vernunzes Draft Competition
Strategy]; Rosen, supra, at 15-16. Emissions from electricity generation contribute to at least four
forms of air pollution that are deleterious to health and the environment. See Titsurritv
BRENNAN ET Al.., A SHOCK TO THE SYSTEM: RESTRUCTURING AMERICA'S ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY
112-13 (1996). Particulate matter, such as soot, dust, dirt and aerosols, can create or exacerbate
breathing and heart problems and lead to cancer and premature death. See id. Particulate matter
also negatively impacts visibility and exposed surfaces. See id. Sulfur dioxide may also affect the
heart and lungs. See id. It additionally may damage trees and contribute to acid rain, which harms
lakes and streams and corrodes exposed materials. See id. Nitrogen dioxide contributes to
ground-level ozone, which causes respiratory problems and crop losses. See id. Greenhouse gases,
primarily carbon dioxide, are believed to contribute to global warming. See id. at 113. Electricity
generation also can lead to the emission of toxic, heavy-metal elements such as mercury, lead
and cadmium. See id. at 114. The shutdown of Massachusetts plants would also have significant
economic consequences. See DPU 96-100, supra note I, § X(C)(1),(3). In addition to losing jobs,
the cities and towns where the generation plants are located will lose a great deal of tax revenue.
See id. Many municipalities rely on the taxation of utilities for large portions of their budgets. See
id. The restructuring of the electricity industry may lead to a reduction in the value of utility
property and tnay reclassify generating facilities as manufacturing equipment, which is exempt
from property taxation. See id.
6 See Scott Allen, AG Targets Midwest Coal Plants: Proposes Restricting Electricity Imports,
BosToN GLOBE, Dec, 3, 1996, at BI; Rosen, supra note 5, at 12- 13, 15.
7 See BRENNAN, Supra note 5, at 116- 17; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite in Fight  Against
Dirty' Midwest Power, POWER MARKET WK„ Dec. 9, 1996 [hereinafter Mass. Calls for Northeast to
Unite]; Allen, ,supra note 6, at BI; Vermont's Draft Competition Strategy Supports, supra note 5, at
4; Rosen, supra note 5, at 15-16. Although the FERC's analysis of the environmental impacts or
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ment of the Northeast may be subjected to increased levels of pollu-
tion.8
 This, in turn, may force Northeastern electricity producers to
implement additional pollution control measures to meet the ambient
air quality standards required by the Clean Air Act, giving Midwest
electricity producers an even greater competitive advantage." Tragi-
cally, this vicious cycle may harm the health and the environment of
the Northeast and force many electricity generation plants in the
region to shutdown.'" If the federal government fails to prevent this
result, the states may have to act independently to ensure that the
restructuring initiative does not lead to impaired human health, a
deteriorated environment and economic ruin."
Several states in the Northeast presently are considering measures
to mitigate this unfortunate by-product of deregulation. 12 These meas-
ures, however, must conform to the United States Supreme Court's
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, which severely limits a state's ability
to enact regulations that impede the flow of interstate commerce.' 3
Officials in Massachusetts, for example, unveiled a series of proposals
in late 1996 to either ban or limit the importation of electricity gener-
ated by facilities that emit high levels of pollution." Using the Massa-
its Order No. 888 found that the rule would have only a small impact on ozone transport from
the Midwest to the Northeast, other studies concluded that the effects would be substantial. See
BRENNAN, supra note 5, at 116-17. A study by Henry Lee and Negeen Darani of Harvard
University's Kennedy School of Government determined that the increase in generation from
existing coal facilities wottld result in a 500,000 ton increase in nitrogen oxide emissions. See id.
at 17. A study done by Resources fin-
 the Future concluded that the increase in pollution could
be substantially higher. See id.
8 See BRENNAN, supra note 5, at 17; Rosen, supra note 5, at 15-16.
9
 See U.S. N.E. Gnus. Urge Midwest Power Plant Emission Study, DOW JONES TELERATE ENERGY
SERV., Dec. 13, 1996; Rosen, supra note 5, at 15; Memorandum front the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, Department of Environmental Protec-
tion, Ensuring Full, Fair and Safe Competition in the Electricity Utility Industry: Generation Perform-
ance Standards for All Electricity Suppliers Serving the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Feh. 24,
1997) (on file with author) [hereinafter Generation Performance Standards for All Electricity
Suppliers].
1 ° See DOE Public Meeting Signals Pollution Rampart as Prime Legislative Cord supra note 5,
at 5; Mass. Eyeing "Ticket to Play", supra note 5, at 7; Vermont's Draft Competition Strategy, supra
note 5, at 4.
11 See infra notes 153-78 and accompanying text.
12
 See Northeast/Power Restructuring -2: May Need Legislative Fix, Dow JONES TELERATE, EN-
ERGY SERV., Dec. 20, 1996, available in WEsitaw; Vt. Agency Urges State Regulators to Keep Control
Over Power Imports, UTIL. ENV'T Rio'., Dec. 6, 1996, at 6; Rhode Island Restructuring Bill Sponsor
Urges National Reciprocity Legislation, N.E. POWER REP., Mar. 15, 1996, at 3.
13 See infra notes 179-247 and accompanying text.
14
 See Generation Performance Standards forAll Electricity Suppliers, supra note 9, at 1-3; Maine
Gov, Mass. AG Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under Competition, ELEC. UTIL Ws., Dec. 9, 1996 at
10; Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Govt. to Penalize Dirty, Imported Power, Wit,. ENy'r REP.,
Dec. 6, 1996, at 1; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7; Mass. Enviro Official Warns
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chusetts proposals as models, this Note analyzes the potential for North-
eastern states to craft individual solutions to this looming problem that
can withstand a challenge under the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution.' 5
 Section II describes the history of the electricity
utility industry and the reasons for the trend toward a competitive
retail market.' 6
 Section III discusses Massachusetts' current plans to
implement a competitive retail market for electricity." Section IV ex-
amines the potential negative impacts that a competitive retail market
could have on the Northeast. 18 Section V then describes several recent
proposals by Massachusetts officials to mitigate these deleterious ef-
fects. 19
 Section VI examines Commerce Clause limitations on a state's
ability to regulate articles of interstate commerce to advance local
interests. 20
 Section VII then analyzes the Commerce Clause implica-
tions of Massachusetts' proposals to limit the negative effects of the
restructuring initiative. 2 t Section VII also suggests possible modifica-
tions to the proposals which would improve their ability to pass muster
under the Commerce Clause. 22
II. THE DRIVE TOWARD A COMPETITIVE RETAIL MARKET
FOR ELECTRICITY
The electricity industry has enjoyed over fifty years of guaranteed
profits and stability as a result of its status as a regulated monopoly. 23
At the present time, however, the era of stability appears to be coming
to an abrupt end. 21
 Spurred on by technological innovation, pressure
from the business sector and recent federal initiatives, the electricity
industry seems poised to undergo a massive restructuring process that
is likely to result in the creation of a competitive retail market. 25
Midwest Regulators to Address Ozone Transport, Dec. 2,1996, available in WE•rLAw [hereinafter,
Mass Enviro Official Warns]; Mass. Plan to Oversee Northeast Power Imports Angers Midwest Coal
Utilities, •rn.. ENV .T REr., December 20,1996, at 7 [hereinafter Mass. Plan to Oversee).
15 See infra notes 248-313 and accompanying text.
IS See infra notes 23-82 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 83-126 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 127-52 and accompanying text.
19 See info notes 153-78 and accompanying text.
2<1 See infra noses 179-247 and accompanying text.
21 See info notes 298-302 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 303-13 and accompanying text.
23 See Navarro, supra note 3, at 349.
24 See id.
25 See Order No. 888, supra note 5; Order No. 889, supra note 3; Hull, supra note 3, at 503-04;
Navarro, supra note 3, at 349-57.
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A. The Regulated Years
Historically, the electrical utility industry has been treated as a
natural monopoly because it was characterized by economies of scale
and high barriers to entry.'[' In order to encourage the expansion of
the electricity industry while avoiding the potential inefficiencies of
monopoly pricing, utility regulators entered into a "regulatory com-
pact" or "regulatory bargain" with the industry.'? The regulatory com-
pact subjects all segments of the electricity industry, generation, trans-
mission and distribution, to comprehensive rate regulation and requires
the utilities to provide reliable service to all of their customers in
return for a guaranteed fair rate of return on capital's
Initially, the regulatory compact satisfied both the electricity in-
dustry and consumers.'`' The guarantee of a fair rate of return on capital
investments gave utilities an incentive to build larger and larger power
plants, thus increasing economies of scale. 3" This, in turn, caused the
inflation-adjusted price of electricity to fall, benefiting the consumers:"
The electricity industry's era of stability, however, was subjected to
a series of disruptions beginning in the late 1970s. 32
 Increased infla-
tion, the Vietnam War, new environmental regulations, the Arab oil
embargo and the unexpected high cost of nuclear power facilities all
contributed to a substantial increase in the cost of generating electric-
ity." The end result was dramatic utility rate hikes that were met by
strong resistance from consumers. 34
 Public utility commissions in many
states refused to increase the utility rates to a level that would allow the
utilities to recover their cost of capital. 35 In turn, the utility executives
were forced to decrease costs, and thus were unable to continue their
large capital expenditures in power plants. 3"
26
 See Douglas L. Heinold, Retail Wheeling: Is Competition Among Energy Utilities an Environ-
mental Disaster; or Can it be Reconciled with Integrated Resource Planning?, 22 RuTc.aitts Com PUTER
& Then L.J. 301,305-06 (1096); Navarro, supra note 3, at 349-50.
'27
 See Heinold, .supra note 26, at 305-06; Navarro, supra note 3, at 349-50.
28
 See Heinold, supra note 26, at 305-06; Navarro, supra note 3, at 349-50.
26 See Heinold, supra note 26, at 306-07; Navarro, supra note 3, at 350.
3° See Heinold, supra note 26, at 306; Navarro, supra note 3, at 350.
31 See Heinold, supra note 26, at 307; Navarro, supra note 3, at 350.
32
 See Heinold, supra note 26, at 307-09; Navarro, supra note 3, at 350-51.
33 See Heinold, supra note 26, at 307-09; Navarro, supra note 3, at 350-51.
34 See Heinold, supra note 26, at 309; Navarro, supra note 3, at 350.
35 See Heinold, supra note 26, at 309; Navarro, supra note 3, at 350.
3° See Navarro, supra note 3, at 350.
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B. Technological Advancements, PURPA and the Rise of
Third Party Generators
Although the utilities themselves no longer had the capital to
invest in new capacity, the demand for new electricity generation was
met by the creation of a new industry of third party generators. 37 Third
party generators are independent producers of electricity who sell their
electricity to the utilities to be delivered to the ultimate customer. 38
Technological innovation and the effects of the Carter Administra-
tion's Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 ("PURPA") com-
bined to stimulate the creation of this new segment of the electricity
industry."
The Carter Administration passed PURPA to stimulate the devel-
opment of alternative sources of electricity, to reduce the nation's
reliance on foreign petroleum imports, and to protect the environ-
ment .° PURPA contained a "must take" provision that required the
utilities to purchase any and all electricity offered by "Qualifying Fa-
cilities" ("QFs").'" Additionally, the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission's (the "FERC") regulations mandated that the utilities pay the
QFs for the electricity at a rate based on the utility's "avoided cost."'''
PURPA, however, provided QFs with a significant subsidy because the
"avoided cost rate" that was calculated greatly exceeded the utilities'
true avoided cost.°
Combined with the subsidy provided by PURPA, technological
innovation also contributed to the third party generator revolution.'"
This was largely due to the development, during the past few decades,
of natural gas-fired generators, which qualify as QFs. 45 New, natural-gas
fired, combined-cycle turbine generators, which are highly efficient
:47 See Heinold, supra note 26, at 310-11; Navarro, supra note 3, at 351, 356-57.
:18 See Heinold, supra note 26, at 310.
'' See Public Utility Regulatory Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.); 2 CONNECTICUT TASK FORCE FOR RESTRUCTURING
THE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY, FINAL REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE, at 2-6 to 2-7 (Dec. 19, 1996)
[hereinafter FINAL REPoirr]; Heinold, supra note 26, at 310-11; Navarro, supra note 3, at 351,
356-57.
4° See Navarro, supra note 3, at 351.
41 See id.
42 See Heinold, ,supra note 26, at 310; Navarro, supra note 3, at 351. The "avoided cost rate"
was intended to be equal to the cost that the utility could save by not generating its own power
from conventional sources. See Heinold, supra note '16, at 310; Navarro, supra note 3, at 351.
43 See Navarro, supra note 3, at 351. The avoided cost price was calculated inaccurately
because it was based upon highly overestimated, long-tertn forecasts of petroleum prices. See id.
11 See id. at 351, 353, 356-57.
45 See FINAL REPORT, .supra note 39, at 2-6 to 2-7; Navarro, supra note 3, at 351, 353, 356-57.
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and use a relatively cheap fuel, are now competitive with traditional
large central station plants, even without the PURPA "avoided cost"
subsidy.'" The existence of a large number of independent power
producers, which can compete effectively with large, central-station
plants, provides a telling indicator that the electricity generation mar-
ket may no longer be a natural monopoly. 47
C. Demands by Industry for Retail Competition
In addition to the combined effects of PURPA and technological
advances, industrial consumers in states with relatively high retail elec-
tricity prices also were a driving force behind the movement toward
the restructuring of the electricity industry. 48 The cost of electricity is
an important factor that businesses must consider when making deci-
sions regarding expansion and relocation, especially for electricity
intensive businesses.'" In this manner, electricity costs have an effect
on the level of employment and economic growth within a particular
region.5" Thus, the price of electricity is very important to politicians,
who have a vested interest in improving their region's overall economic
health . 5 '
In states where the cost of electricity is above either the national
average or the price offered in neighboring states, industry consumers
have relocated or have threatened to relocate to cut costs. 52 For exam-
ple, in Massachusetts, Raytheon, one of the state's largest employers,
proposed a retail "wheeling" bill and threatened to relocate to another
state unless it received a forty percent rate reduction." In California,
where electricity costs are roughly fifty percent above the national
46 See FINAL REPoirr, supra note 39, at 2-6 to 2-7; Navarro, supra note 3, at 353,357. Small,
Brayton-cycle, gas-fired combustion turbine units, generating 25 to 250 MW, can he installed at
one-half to one-third the capital cost of conventional steam-electric stations. See Navarro, supra
note 3, at 357 & n.43 (quoting Kurt. Yeager, Technology and Industry Structure, ELEC. J., July 1995,
at 58). According to one source, they can generate power at less than 3.0 cents per kWh. See
Navarro, supra note 3, at 357 & n.41 (quoting Vinod Dar, The Future of the U.S. lf;lectric
Industry, Eutc. J., July 1995, at 17). Another source claimed that "iglenerating electricity by
burning natural gas .. . is cheaper than producing power in even the most efficient new com-
bined-cycle power plants." See Navarro, supra note 3, at 357 u.42 (quoting Vikrain Budltraja,
Generation as a Business
—Facts, Fumbles, Fictions and the Future, ELEC. J., July 1995, at 36-41).
47 See FINAL, REPORT, supra note 39, at 2-7; Navarro, supra note 3, at 356-57.
4H See Heinold, supra note 26, at 312-13; Navarro, supra note 3, at 354.
'a See Heinold, supra note 26, at 312-13; Navarro, supra note 3, at 354.
' See Heinold, supra note 26, at 312-13; Navarro, supra note 3, at 354.
51 See Heinold, .supra note 26, at 313; Navarro, supra note 3, at 354.
52
 See Heinold, supra note 26, at 312-13; Navarro, supra note 3, at 354.
53 See Denise Warkentin, States Place Increased Importance on Retail
-Wheeling Issues, Initiatives,
LIGHT & POWER, April 1,1996, at 15. The wheeling bill would have allowed Raytheon to
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average, the state's economy has lost jobs to job pirates" from neigh-
boring states that offer electricity that is between two to six cents per
kilowatt hour ("kWh") cheaper." It is not surprising, therefore, that
California was the first state to propose the restructuring of the elec-
tricity industry by deregulating generation and opening the utility
transmission grid to competitive electric suppliers. 55
D. Federal Initiatives that have Accelerated the Drive Towards the
Deregulation of the Electricity Industry
In addition to the technological advances, the effects of PURPA
and demands by industry, recent federal initiatives also have contrib-
uted to the drive towards retail competition.'" Specifically, a series of
recent federal initiatives have opened the nation's transmission grid."'
Providing access to the electricity transmission grid is absolutely essen-
tial for a competitive electricity retail market to succeed. 58
Historically, a utility's sole right to its transmission grid has allowed
the utility to insulate itself from competition and to secure its monop-
oly power." Competitors who could offer less expensive electricity to
the utility's customers had to pay the utility a transmission fee in order
to "wheel" the electricity to the consumer.'" The transmission fee could
be set in such a manner as to totally offset the price advantage held by
the lower cost competitor, effectively thwarting competition. 81
purchase its electricity from the supplier of its choice, presumably at a lower cost. See id. Wheeling
is the process of sending electricity from one utility to its final destination over the transmission
lines of another utility. Swim NT Comm. ON ELEC. UTII.. RESTRUCTURING OF TIIE MASS. LEGISLA-
TuRE, 103 (Man 20, 1997) (hereinafter , JOINT COMM.].
54 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 2-7; Navarro, supra note 3, at 354. In 1995, the average
retail electricity rate in California was 10.16 cents per kWh, compared to 8.45 cents per kWh in
the upper Midwest and 5.77 cents per kWh in the Midwest. See Final Report, supra note 39,
page 3-5.
55 See Navarro, supra note 3, at 354-55. The transmission grid is simply the lines and litcilities
used to transfer electricity. See Heinhold, supra note 26, at 306. As will be discussed below, the
utilities own and control the transmission grid, giving them monopoly power. See infra notes
59-61 and accompanying text.
55 See FINAL REPORT, SUP.ra note 39, at 2-15 to 2-17; DPU 96-100, supra note I, § 1(2); Hull,
supra note 3, at 503-05; Navarro, supra note 3, at 352.
57 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 2-15 to 2-17; DPU 96-100, supra note 1, § 1(2); Hull,
supra note 3, at 503-05; Navarro, supra note 3, at 352.
58 See DPU 96-100, supra note I, § IV(C) (3).
59 See Navarro, supra note 3, at 352.
' 4 ' See id. at 352.
Cl See id. at 352.
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The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (the "EPAct") provided one step
towards creating a competitive retail electricity market." 2 The EPAct
provided FERC with the authority to order utilities to wheel wholesale
power through their transmission grids for third parties.''" This pro-
vided outside producers with some access to the utility's wholesale
customers, and created a new class of wholesale generators."'
Two orders issued by FERC on April 14, 1996 ultimately set the
stage for the restructuring of the electricity industry, complete with
retail competition."' FERC's Order No. 888 will allow all participants
in the electricity market nondiscriminatory, open access to the nation's
transmission network.'''' Under Order No. 888, utilities are not required
to divest their generation assets.° The utilities, however, must "func-
tionally unbundle" or "functionally separate" their transmission assets
from their generating assets. 68
 In this manner, the utilities must file
nondiscriminatory, open access transmission tariffs that separately list
the rates for wholesale generation, transmission and ancillary serv-
ices.''`' The utilities then must offer transmission services to wholesale
competitors at the same rate and under the same terms that it provides
transmission services for its own wholesale sales and purchases.'" As a
result, competitors will be able to offer wholesale electricity to custom-
ers within the utility's transmission grid at a cost equivalent to the
utility's transmission cost, allowing for a recovery of stranded costs. 7 '
62 See DPU 96-100, supra note 1, § 1(2); Navarro, supra note 3, at 352.
63 See MU 96-100, supra note 1, § 1(2); Navarro, supra note 3, at 352.
134 See Navarro, supra note 3, at 352.
65 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 2-15 to 2-16; DPU 96-100, supra note I , § 1(2); Hull,
supm note 3, at 503-05.
6" See FINAL liEroicr, supra note 39, at 2-15; Hull, supra note 3, ;11.503.
See Hull, supra note 3, at 51)4. It is feared dial the utilities will give preferential treatment
to their own generation thcilities at the expense of competitors. See id. Nevertheless, Order No.
MSS does 11(41 force utilities to divest their generation assets. See id. Instead, Order No. 888 will
attempt to handle this problem as discussed below. See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text
wi See Hull, supra note 3, at 504. The terms "6[110ton:illy unbundle" and "functionally
separate" simply mean that the utilities must treat their own generation assets as if they were
separately owned, See DPU 96-100, supra mite 1, § 11(1t)(3). As a result, the utilities may not give
preferential treatment, such as lower transmission lees, to their own generation assets. See id.
Sre Hull, supra note 3, at 503.
7I) See FINAL. RFAuner, supra mule 39, at 2-15; Hull, supra note 3, at 503.
7 i See FINAL. REpoicr, supra note 39, at 2-15 to 2-16; Hull, supra note 3, at 503,508. Stranded
costs are the imbedded costs of power plants and other facilities, which were built by the utilities
under the regulatory compact, that the utilities will not. he able to recover in a competitive market
because they will no longer be guaranteed a fair rate of return. See. DPU 96-100, supra note 1,
4 X1(A).
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In all, Order No. 888 will allow outside competitors to compete with
utilities based upon the cost of generation. 72
Even more importantly, Order No. 888 also provides for nondis-
criminatory retail competition." Although Order No. 888 does not
require that utilities provide competitors with nondiscriminatory ac-
cess to retail customers, nondiscriminatory transmission services for
retail sales may be offered voluntarily by the utilities, which may be
unlikely, or pursuant to state retail access programs. 74 Thus, Order No.
888 sets the stage for the creation of open and competitive retail
markets for electricity in individual states. 75 As will be discussed below,
Massachusetts already has unveiled several proposals to establish a
competitive retail market for electricity. 75
The creation of retail markets under Order No. 888 could be
facilitated by FERC's Order No. 889, which was issued simultaneously
with Order No. 888. 77 Order No. 889 requires public utilities to create
an electronic system, accessible via the Internet, which provides infor-
mation regarding available transmission capacity, pricing and related
information. 78 Thus, Order No. 888 and Order No. 889 provide the
tools necessary to create an open, competitive retail market for elec-
tricity in individual states. 7 •
Thus, these recent federal initiatives set the stage for the complete
restructuring of the electricity industry. 8° The EPAct and FERC's Or-
ders No. 888 and 889 developed the framework to allow for nondis-
criminatory retail competition.'" It is now in each state's power to
establish a competitive market for retail sales of electricity by develop-
ing its own retail access programs. 52
72 See DPU 96-100, supra note 1, § IV(C) (3).




71 ' See infra notes 83-126 and accompanying text.
77 See FINAL. REPORT, supra note 39, at 2-16; Hull, supra note 3, at 504.
73 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 2-16; Hull, supra note 3, at 504.
73 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 2-15 to 2-16; Hull, supra note 3, at 503-05.
See FINAL. REPORT, supra note 39, at 2-15 to 2-17; DPU 96-100, supra note 1, § 1(2); Hull,
supra note 3, at 503-05; Navarro, supra note 3, at 352.
31 See FINAL REPORT, supra note 39, at 2-15 to 2-16; DPU 96-100, supra note 1, §1(2); Hull,
supra note 3, at 503-05; Navarro, supra note 3, at 352.
82 See Hull, supra note 3, at 505.
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HI. MASSACHUSETTS' PLAN TO RESTRUCTURE
THE ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY
Massachusetts is among the states that already has proposed plans
to restructure its electric utility industry." Currently, Massachusetts
officials have unveiled four such plans.'" On September 12, 1996,
Massachusetts Attorney General Scott Harshbarger announced an in-
itiative termed "Consumers First" which plans to introduce retail com-
petition in the state beginning January 1, 1998.85
 The Massachusetts
Department of Public Utilities (the "MDPU") unveiled its proposal to
restructure the electricity industry on December 30, 1996. 86 In Febru-
ary of 1997, Massachusetts Governor William Weld submitted to the
state legislature a bill to restructure the electricity industry.° More
recently, on March 20, 1997, a joint committee of the Massachusetts
legislature filed its own bill to restructure the industry. 88
A. "Consumers First": The Massachusetts Attorney General's
Initiative to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry
On September 12, 1996, Attorney General Scott Harshbarger un-
veiled his plan to restructure the electric utility industry in Massachu-
setts." The initiative, termed "Consumers First," would allow all Mas-
sachusetts consumers of investor-owned utilities, both residential and
business, to choose their own supplier of retail electricity." The plan
also stresses increased competition, preservation of reliability and pro-
tection of the environment."'
Under the "Consumers First" plan, all Massachusetts customers of
investor-owned, as opposed to municipally-owned, utilities will be able
I See generally DPU 96-100, supra note 1; Harshbarger Unveils, supra note 1, at 1 -5; Hull,
supra note 3, at 513; NEES, Mass. AG Competition Pact, supra note I, at 6; NEES, Mass. AG Seek
Industry Support, supra note 1, at 9.
84 See 1997 MA H.13.4311; JotNT Comm„ supra note 53; See Harshbarger Unveils, supra note
1, at 1-5; NEES, Mass. AG Competition Pact, supra note 1, at 6; NEES, Mass. AG Seek Industry
Support, ,supra note 1, at 9.
H5
 See Harshbarger Unveils, supra note 1, at 1 -5; NEES, Mass. AG Competition Pact, supra
1, at 6; NEES, Mass. AG Seek Industry Support, supra note 1, at 9.
8;
	 generally DPU 96-100, supra note 1.
4/7
 See generally 1997 MA 1-1.11. 4311.
88
 See generally JOINT COMM ., supra note 53.
' 49
 See Harshbarger Unveils, supra note 1, at 1 -5; NEES, Mass. AG Competition Pact, supra note
1, at 6; NEES, Mass. AG Seek Industry Support, supra note 1, at 9.
See Harshbarger Unveils, supra note 1, at I.
9 ' we id, at 1-5; NEES, Mass. AG Competition Pact, supra note 1, at 6.
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to choose their electricity supplier on January 1, 1998.92 Based on a
Massachusetts Electric pilot program, which resulted in savings of four-
teen percent, it is estimated that electricity consumers could benefit
from substantial savings by entering the competitive market." The plan
also guarantees a savings of at least ten percent off today's prices for
consumers who choose not to enter the competitive market, and in-
stead accept the "Standard Offer."94 At this guaranteed ten percent rate
reduction, the Attorney General estimates that Massachusetts consum-
ers will save three billion dollars over the first seven years of the plan.95
The "Consumer First" plan also. strives to ensure fair competition
among the suppliers of electricity. 96 Outside competitors will be given
a real chance to compete with the utilities because all suppliers will be
allowed to bid for the right to supply the "Standard Offer" consumers
as well as the consumers who enter the competitive market. 97 The
existing utilities will also be treated fairly under the plan since they will
be allowed to recover their "stranded costs" through a charge that will
remain at 2.8 cents per kWh for the first three years, and will decline
over time."' Current levels of reliability and customer satisfaction will
be maintained by penalizing sub-standard providers up to two million
dollars.•"
In addition, the Attorney General's "Consumers First" plan has
several provisions intended to protect the state's environment."' As
part of the plan, after the year 2000, older, fossil-fueled plants will have
to meet the same emissions standards as new plants by the time the
older plant is forty years old or by 2010, whichever occurs first.'"' The
92 See. Harshbarger Unveils, supra note 1, at 1; NITS, Mass. AG Seek Industry Support, supra
note 1, at 9.
95 See Harshbaigei Unveils, supra note 1, at 2.
94 See Harshbarger Unveils, supra note 1, at 1 -2; NEES, Mass. AG Seek Industry Support, supra
note 1, at 9.
95
 See Harshbarger Unveils, supra note 1, at 1 -2.
9" See id. at 2.
97 See id.; NEES, Mass. AG Seek Industry Support, supra note 1, at 9.
98 See Harshbarger Unveils, supra note 1, at 3; NESS, Mass. AG Competition Pact, supra note
1, at 6; NEES, Mass. AG Seek Industry Support, supra note I, at 9.
99 See Harshbarger Unveils, supra note 1, at 1 -2; NEES, Mass. AG Competition Pact, supra note
I, at 6; NEES, Mass. AG Seek Industry Support, supra note I, at 9.
1151 See Harshbarger Unveils, supra note I, at 3; NITS, Mass. AC Competition Pact, supra note
1, at 6; NEES, Mass. AG Seek Industry Support, supra note 1, at 9.
1 ° 1 See Harshbarger Unveils, supra note I, at 3; NEES, Mass. AG Competition Pact, supra note
I, at 6; NEES, Mass. AG Seek Industry Support, supra note 1, at 9. This provision, however, will
apply only to generating plants within Massachusetts. See Harshbarger Unveils, supra note 1, at 3;
Testimony of Allan F. Bedwell, Deputy Commissioner of the Massachusetts Department of Envi-
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plan also requires funding for renewable energy options and efficiency
and conservation programs."For these reasons, the "Consumers First"
initiative has gained the approval of some environmentalists."
B. The MDPU Approach
On December 30, 1996, the MDPU unveiled its plan to restructure
the electricity industry in Massachusetts." The MDPU intends to im-
plement a competitive market for electricity by January 1, 1998." In
restructuring the electricity industry, the MDPU hopes to develop an
efficient and fair industry structure that minimizes consumer costs,
maintains safe and reliable service and minimizes the impact on the
environment."
The MDPU proposal includes several provisions to foster efficiency
and fairness in the restructured electricity industry.' 07 The plan pro-
poses that an independent system operator will oversee the bulk power
system in New England, which comprises the generation and transmis-
sion facilities in the region. 108
 The MDPU will continue to regulate the
distribution of electricity, which continues to exhibit the characteristics
of a natural monopoly, in order to provide an orderly and expeditious
transition to the new industry structure." The MDPU is hopeful that.
Order No. 888, as discussed in Section III, will allow all generators of
electricity equal access to transmission facilities at identical prices.""
ronmental Protection, before the Joint Electric Utility Restructuring Committee of the Great and
General Court, Dec. 10,1990.
HP2
 See Harshkirger Unveils., supra note 1, at 3; NEES, Mass. AG Competition Pact, supra note
I, at 0; NEES, Mass. AG Seek Industry Support, supra note 1, at 9.
I" See NEES, Mass. AG Competition Pad, supra mar I, at 0. Lew Milford, senior attorney for
the Conservation Law Foundation, stated that, "01 I allows new, cleaner plants and renewable
energy to compete for customers head-to-head against existing dirtier plants. It requires existing,
dirtier coal and oil plants to clean up w the tight emissions standards their new competitors must
meet." Id.
194 See generally DPU 90- 100, .supra note 1.
'°' See id. § 1(A).
"'See generally id. Executive Summary Introduction, § 111(C).
1"7 See generally id. §§ Ill, IV, VI.
See id. § III(C). The independent system operator will he completely independent of
participants in competitive market for generation. See Id. Thus, the independent system operator
will be responsible for operating the bulk power system in a non-discriminatory manner dial
furthers efficient competition. See id. The independent system operator will also he responsible
frir maintaining current sunidards of reliability, for collecting information on power plant emis-
sions, and for ensuring open access to the transmission system at non-discriminatory prices. See id.
I19 See DPU 96- 100, supra note 1, § VI (13) (3).
110 See id. § IV(C) (3).
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The MDPU proposal also attempts to prevent the potential abuse
of vertical market power by companies that possess generation, trans-
mission and distribution facilities."' Although the MDPU asserts that
the cleanest solution to the problem of inter-affiliate transactions is to
mandate divestiture of generation assets, it recognizes that it does not
possess either the explicit or implicit statutory authority to do so." 2
Thus, while it merely encourages the divestiture of generation assets,
the MDPU proposal requires the functional separation of generation,
transmission and distribution assets within a single company." 3 The
MDPU proposal also attempts to treat the existing electric utilities fairly
by allowing them a reasonable opportunity to recover net, non-mitiga-
ble stranded costs.'" The MDPU concluded that it was in the best in-
terest of all concerned to allow for the recovery of reasonable stranded
costs even though the electric companies have not established a clear
legal en titlemen t." 5
111 See id. § V(B) (3).
IL 2 See id. §V(B) (1),(3).
11 :s See id. § V(B) (3). To effectuate the functional separation of a single company's genera-
tion, transmission and distribution assets, the MDPU proposes clear and enforceable rules of
conduct to govern the interaction of the various divisions. See id. Additionally, electric companies
that maintain generation facilities must create a separate marketing affiliate if they wish to sell
power in the competitive marketplace. See id.
"See DPU 96-100, supra note 1, § XI(B)(5). The MDPU defines stranded costs as:
(1) the amount of the book cost or fixed cost associated with producing electricity
from existing generation facilities that might not be recovered by the competitive
market price for generation; (2) liabilities for future decommissioning and radio-
active waste disposal associated with nuclear power plants that might not be recov-
ered by the market price; (3) the amount by which the cost of existing contractual
conunitments for purchased power exceeds the competitive market price for gen-
eration; and (4) prudently incurred regulatory assets related to generation that
were intended to be collected over time consistent with regulatory precedent or
order.
§ XI(D)(1).
115 See id. § Xl(B)(4). The electric companies claim that they are legally entitled to stranded
cost recovery under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution,
which prohibit the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. See id.
§ XI (13)(3)(6). Although the MDPU is not convinced that the electric utilities would succeed
under the Takings Clause, it determined that allowing stranded cost recovery would "(1) ensure
the provision of sound electric services during the transition to competition; (2) affirm reliability
of commitments, which is an essential element in any future industry structure; (3) promote
federal and state coordination and ensure equal treatment of similarly-situated utilities; and (4)
avoid costly, reform-delaying litigation." Id. § XI (13)(4). The MDPU proposes that the legislature
should require utilities that receive stranded cost recovery to make payments to their host
municipalities in lieu of tax payments. See id. § X(C)(3). As discussed in note five, municipalities
stand to lose a great deal of tax revenue because restructuring could reduce the value of utility
property and could reclassify generating facilities as manufacturing equipment, which is exempt
from property taxation. See id. § X(C)(1).
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The MDPU proposal also contains provisions intended to benefit
consumers of electricity, by striving to decrease the cost of electricity
and by ensuring reliable service."" The MDPU proposal envisions that
most consumers will obtain the lowest price for electricity by contract-
ing with a competitive supplier."' Customers who never contract with
a competitive supplier will receive standard offer generation service
from their distribution companies." 8
 The standard offer generation
service will be offered for five years and will be regulated by the
MDPU."9 Customers who participate in the competitive market for
electricity, but later leave the market for any reason, will be provided
with the default service. 12" The default service will act as a safety net to
provide temporary supply to customers as they seek a new, competitive
supplier. 12 ' The price for default service will be determined based on
the spot market clearing prices.' 22
 Further customer protection will be
provided for consumers who face financial difficulties and who's health
would be placed at risk by the termination of electricity services: 23
The MDPU plan also seeks to get municipally owned plants to
enter the competitive retail market.' 24
 Although the MDPU indicates
that it lacks the authority to require municipal utilities to open their
service areas to competition, the department encourages them to allow
their customers to participate in the retail market for generation of
electricity: 25
 The MDPU, however, believes that it has the authority to
require municipal utilities that sell power on the competitive market
116 See generally id. § VII.
117 See id. § V1I(A). In order to be eligible, competitive suppliers must register with the MDPU
and supply basic information concerning prices and the environmental impact of its generation
process. See id. § VII(13) (2),(6). The MDPU indicated that many members of the public voiced
concern that they will he inundated with telephone solicitations from potential suppliers. See id.
§(B) (3). The MDPU did not offer its own solution, but stated that competitive suppliers' ability
to solicit customers will be limited by existing federal statutes and regulations. See id.
See id. § VII (C) (3) (b).
113 See DPU 96-100, supra note 1, § VII(C) (3) (b). The MDPU plans to set the standard offer
rate at a level that will provide discounts compared to current electricity rates, yet at a level that
will encourage customers to participate in the competitive generation market. See id.
1 " See id. § VII (C) (3)(c).
121 See id.
122 See id,
123 See id. § VII (D). The MDPU plan proposes a winter moratorium On terminating service
to customers who demonstrate a financial hardship, the prohibition of the termination of service
to elderly and ill customers and to customers who have an infant, and restrictions on the
termination of service to tenants whose electricity bills arc paid by their landlords. See id. § VII
(D)(1).
12.1
 See DPU 96-100, supra note 1, § X(A) (3).
125 See id. § X(A) (1),(3),
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to offer reciprocal rights to all suppliers of generation to sell electricity
within the municipal utility's service territory. 126
IV. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF A RESTRUCTURED ELECTRICITY
INDUSTRY ON REGIONAL COM PF:FITION AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The "Consumers First" plan does contain provisions for fair com-
petition among producers of electricity and protection of the environ-
ment.' 27 The development of a competitive market for retail electricity,
nevertheless, may place Massachusetts electricity producers at a severe
competitive disadvantage, as compared to producers in other regions
of the nation, and may deteriorate the state's environment.' 28 This
unfortunate result may occur as a result of increased utilization of low
cost coal plants in the Midwest and the resultant increase in emissions
that travel to the Northeast. 129
A. The Competitive Advantage of Coal Production and the
Resulting Vicious Cycle
There are several reasons why coal plants in the Midwest may
significantly increase production."" First, the advent of retail competi-
tion and access to new markets, such as Massachusetts consumers, will
provide strong incentives for all generators of electricity to increase
production in order to increase their market share."' The 150 coal
126 See id. 4 X (A) (3).
1 '27
 See Harsithrurr Unveils, supra note I. at 3; NEES, Mass. AG Competition Part, supra note
1, at 6; NEES, Mass. AG Seek Industry Support, supra now 1, at 9.
128 See Allen, supra note 6, at B1; Generation Performance Standards for All Electricity Suppliers,
supra note 9, at 1 -2; Mass. Plan to Oversee, supra note 14, at 7; U.S. N.E. Goys. -2: Unequal
Environment Rules Help Midwest, Dow JONES TELERATE ENERGY SERV., Dec. 16, 1996, available in
WEs•aw [hereinafter Unequal Environment Rules]; U.S. N.E. Goes. Urge Midwest Power Plant
Emission Study, supra note 9.
129 See Allen, supra note 6, at Bl; New Hampshire Plan Will Not Address Issue of Emissions from
Older Plants, UTII.. ENVT REP., Sept. 27, 1996, at 7; Northeast to Unite in Fight Against Dirty'
Midwest Power,Posmi MARKry WE.. Dec. 9, 1996; Vermont's Draft Competition Strategy, supra note
5, at 4; Rosen, supra note 5, at 15-16. It is believed that Massachusetts is the recipient of Ozone
and other p0111.1liaitti alai travel from the Midwest. See Letter from Allan F. Bedwell, Deputy
Commissioner of the Commonwealth of MiltitiaChlISCILS DepaEI/IICIII. of Environmental Protection,
to Senator John D. O'Brien, Senate Chair of the,joint Committee on Electric Utility Restructuring
(January 29. 1997) (on file with author). The Ozone Transport Assessment Group, a 37-state
organization established to study the impact of the transport of ozone, has determined that
pollution transportation is a function of metettrology and atmospheric chemistry, and that under
certain conditions, ozone and other pollutants can be transported hundreds of miles. See id.
See BRENNAN, SRpEa note 5, at 117-18; Allen, supra note H. at BI; Rosen, supra note 5, at
12-15.
1111 See Allen, supra note 6, at B1; Rosen, supra mote 5, at 13.
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units in the Midwest, which are currently underutilized, could easily
begin producing more power.' 32
Additionally, coal producers in the Midwest have a significant
competitive advantage over electricity producers in the Northeast.'" In
1995 the average cost of electricity was nearly twice as high in the
Northeast as it was in the Midwest.'" This price discrepancy is due in
part to the positive correlation between low cost of production and
high levels of emission.'" The Midwest operates approximately 150
coal-Fired power plants, many of which are so old that they are not.
subject to modern air pollution standards. 1 :"' Although these plants
produce electricity at. a lower cost than all other forms of production,
they may produce as much as ten times the amount of pollution as
natural gas-fired generators, which are subject to modern emissions
standards. 137 Electricity generators in the Northeast, on the other hand,
are subject to pollution standards that are two to ten times more
stringent than federal standards.'" This is due to the fact that air
quality standards for ozone frequently have been exceeded in the
Northeast.' 39
The interaction between the competitive advantage possessed by
Midwest producers of electricity and their high level of emissions could
create a vicious cycle that will cause Northeastern producers to be even
less competitive and will further deteriorate the environment."' As
132 See BRENNAN, supra. note 5, at 117-18; Allen, supra note 6, at B ; Rosen, supra note 5,
at 12.
133 See BRENNAN, ,CUP/11 note 5, at 117; Mass. Plan to Oversee, supra note 1 4 , at 7; Unequal
Environment Rules, supra note 128; U.S. N.E. Govs. Urge Midwest Power Plant Emission Study,
supra note 9; Rosen, supra note 5, at 15.
131 See FINAL. REPORT, supra note '39, at 3-5. In 1995, the average retail price of electricity was
10.22 cents per kWh in the Northeast and 5.77 cents per kWh in the Michvest. See id. The
Northeast's significant reliance on nuclear power, which is very expensive due to the high cost
of safety measures, contributes to the price difference. See Ross Kerber, Nuclear Industry Fares
Charges of Gutting Comm WALL Sr. J. Feb. 1, 1996, at B4.
1 :15 See Rosen, supra note 5, at I S.
1311 See. Allen, supra note 6, at Bl; Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Goys, to Penalize Dirty,
Imported Power, supra note 14, at 1; Mass. Calls. firr Northeast to Unite, SUP111 note 7; U.S. NE.
Coos. Urge Midwest Power Plant Emission Study, supra Rote 9; Rosen, supra note 5, at 14.
137 See BRENNAN, supra Mite 5. at 114, 118; NY iklEX Official Urges Congress to Ignore Environ-
mental Concerns on Competition, Um.. ENV'T Rio'., April 12, 1996, at 12; Rosen, supra note 5,
at 14.
158 See Rosen, supra note 5, at 15 n.13.
1311 See Letter from Allan F. Bedwell to Sen. John 1). O'Brien, supra note 129; Rosen, supra
note 5, at 15. Mr. Bedwell indicated that Massachusetts exceeded the ozone standard 109 times
over 30 days in 1988, 36 times over 9 days in 1991, 18 times over 9 days in 1993, 17 times over 8
days in 1995 and 2 times during the summer of 1996. See Letter from Allan F. Bedwell to Sen.
John D. O'Brien, supra. The unusually cool SIIM/Iler of 1096 was credited with the relatively low
number of exceedances in 1096, as high temperatures exacerbate problems with pollution. See id.
Hp See Allen, supra note 6, at BI; Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Coos, to Penalize Dirty,
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Midwestern coal facilities increase production to meet the demand that
a competitive market will create for their low cost product, they will
emit even higher levels of pollution which will be transported to the
Northeast."' This increase in pollution in the Northeast will make it
even more difficult than it already is for electricity producers in the
Northeast to meet the federal pollution standards."' As a result, the
cost of producing electricity in the Northeast will increase further, thus
increasing the competitive advantage held by the Midwestern produc-
ers. 145
 This will provide even more pressure for Midwestern coal facili-
ties to produce at higher levels, and the cycle will continue.'" The end
result to the Northeast could be disastrous. 145 Many electricity genera-
tion plants in the Northeast could be shut down, the environment
could deteriorate severely and human health could be placed at risk
as a result of the increased levels of pollution.' 45
B. Possible Federal Solutions
The federal government may be able to ameliorate the pollution
transport problem and break the vicious cycle described above before
it starts."' In fact, there have been indications that the Clinton admini-
stration is planning to introduce legislation concerning the ozone
transportation problem. 198 Even if this does not occur, several other
potential federal remedies exist. 149
The Ozone Transportation Assessment Group (the "OTAG") has
been investigating the problem for several years, but has not yet found
Imported Power, supra note 14, at 1; Mass. Eyeing "Ticket to Play," supra note 5, at 7; U.S. N.E.
Govs. Urge Midwest Power Plant Emission Study, supra note 9; Generation Performance Standards
for All Electricity Suppliers, supra note 9, at 1-2; Rosen, supra note 5, at 15.
141 See supra notes 6-8.
142
 See Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Goys. to Penalize Dirty, Imported Power, supra note
14, at 1; U.S. N.E. Govs. Urge Midwest Power Plant Emission Study, SU pro note 9; Generation
Performance Standards for All Electricity Suppliers, supra note 9, at 2; Rosen, supra note 5, at 15.
143 See Allen, supra note 6, at III; Rosen, supra note 5, at 15.
See Allen, supra note 6, at 131; Rosen, supra note 5, at 15.
145 See Allen, supra note 6, at 131; DOE Public Meeting Signals Pollution Transport as Prime
Legislative Goal, supra note 5, at 5; Vermont's Draft Competition Strategy, supra note 5, at 4;
Generation Performance Standards for All Electricity Suppliers, supra note 9, at 1 -2.
146 See supra note 5.
147
 See DOE Public Meeting Signals Pollution Transport as Prime Legislative Goal, supra note 5,
at 5; EPA Proposes Tighter Rules on PM and Ozone, COAL & SYNEUELS TEctt., Dec. 6, 1996; New
Air Rules Could Reduce Pollution Row  into Northeast, THE BERKSHIRE Dee. 1, 1996; New
EPA Standard Gould Cramp Utilities, THE Dx.. DAILY, Vol. 8, No 119,,Ian. 30, 1997, at 1; Reactions
to New Particulate/Ozone Proposal Vary by Fuel Mix, Location, Urn_ ENV'• REP., Dec. 20, 1996, at I.
148 See DOE Public Meeting Signals Pollution 'Transport as Prime Legislative Goal, supra note
5, at 5.
149 See infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
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a feasible solution.m The Environmental Protection Agency (the "EPA")
recently proposed new, tougher emissions standards that may force
coal facilities to be retrofitted with pollution control devices, thus
leveling the playing field by reducing the pollution flow into the North-
east. 15 ' Congress has also taken some action to address this problem, as
several bills have been introduced in the past year to restructure the
electricity industry on a national scale.' 52
1 '4' See New Air Rules Could Reduce Pollution Flow into Northeast, supra note 147; OTAG: Ozone
to Hit the Fan, ELEC. DAILY, Nov. 1, 1996. OTAG is a partnership between the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Environmental Council of the States, 37 state governments east of the
Rocky Mountains and many industry and environmental groups. See New Air Rules Could Reduce
Pollution How into Northeast, supra note 147. OTAG plans to create a comprehensive, super-re-
gional ozone control strategy in the early months of 1997, See OTAG: Ozone to Hit the Fan, supra.
arAG may be considering an 85% across-the-board reduction of nitrogen oxide emissions from
power plants. See id. Critics of OTAG believe that it may take much longer for OTAG to develop
its plan because of the dozens of contradictory proposals and fundamental disagreements over
the science of ozone transport. See id.
151
 See generally National Ambient Air Quality Standards For Ozone, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,637
(1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50) (proposed Dec. 13, 1996); Interim Implementation
Policy on New or Revised Ozone and Particulate Matter (PM) National Ambient Air Quality
Standards (NAAQS), 61 Fed. Reg. 65,715 (1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pl. 51) (proposed
Dec. 13, 1996); Implementation of New or Revised Ozone and Particulate Matter (PM) National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) and Regional 1-laze Regulations, 6l Fed. Reg. 65,751
(1996) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 51) (proposed Dec. 13, 1996); Proposed Requirements for
Designation of Reference and Equivalent Methods for PM 2.5 and Ambient Air Quality Surveil-
lance for Particulate Matter, 61 Fed. Reg. 65,763 (1996) (to he codified at 40 C.F.R. tits, 53, 58)
(proposed Dec. 13, 1996); EPA Proposes Tighter Rules on PM and Ozone, supra note 147; EPA
Release of New Ozone/PM Standards to Stir Congressional and Court Actions, 24 ENERGY REP. No.
47, Dec. 2, 1996, available in 1996 WL 11831806; New Air Rules Could Reduce Pollution Flow into
Northeast, .supra note 147; New EPA Standard Could Cramp Utilities, supra note 147, at 1; Reactions
to New Particulate/Ozone Proposal Vary by Fuel Mix, Location, supra note 147, at I. The EPA
proposes to lower the size of particulates that it regulates from 10 microns to 2.5 microns (for
reference, a human hair is approximately 50 microns thick). See EPA Proposes Tighter Rules on
PM and Ozone, supra note 147; EPA Release of New Ozone/PM Standards to Stir Congressional and
Court Actions, supra. Smaller particulates may cause the most harm to the respiratory system
because they lodge deeper in the lungs than larger particles and are more difficult For the lung's
self-defense mechanisms to remove. See Reactions to New Particulate/Ozone Proposal Vary by Fuel
Mix, Location, supra note 147, at 1. To further limit ozone, the EPA also intends to replace the
current one-hour standard of 0.12 parts per million with an eight-hour standard of 0.08 parts per
million. See EPA Proposes Tighter Rules on PM and Ozone, .supra note 147; EPA Release of New
Ozone/PM Standards to Stir Congressional and Court Actions, supra. The EPA's proposed rules face
opposition from both industry, which is concerned about the high cost of compliance, and
Republican leaders in Congress, who may challenge the stricter standards under a new law that
gives them the power to review all major federal regulations. See Reactions to New Particulate/Ozone
Proposal Vary by Fuel Mix, Location, supra note 147, at 1; EPA Release of New Ozone/PM Standards
to Stir Congressional and Court Actions, supra..
152
 See Restructuring Bills Aim to Protect Renewables in Competitive Markets, UHL ENV'T REP.,
July 19, 1996. A bill proposed by Rep. Dan Schaefer (R-Colo.) would require each generator to
submit renewable energy credits to the FERC that amount to a certain percentage of the total
energy produced by the generator that year. See id. The renewable energy credits could be
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V. MASSACHUSETTS' PROPOSED ATTEMPTS TO PREVENT THE
IMPORTATION OF "DIRTY" ELECTRICITY
In case there is no adequate federal solution in place by January
1, 1998, officials in Massachusetts are developing several contingency
plans to maintain the competitiveness of in-state power producers, the
health of the state's citizens and the integrity of the environment.'"
The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (the
"MDEP") recently proposed a plan to force out-of-state electricity pro-
ducers to prove that their facilities meet certain environmental stand-
ards before they can sell electricity in the state.'" In a similar develop-
ment, Massachusetts Attorney General Scott Harshbarger circulated a
proposal to the twelve Northeastern governors, calling on them to
form a "clean air compact" to ban or limit the importation of "dirty"
power.' 55
A. The Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection
"Ticket to Play" Plan
MDEP Commissioner David Struhs recently unveiled a back-up
plan to address the problems which would be caused by the transport
of pollution from Midwest power producers to the Northeast if OTAG
and the proposed EPA emissions standards fail to arrive at an accept-
able solution.' 56
 The MDEP plan consists of a series of alternative steps
that the state can take to get Midwestern electricity producers to
obtained either by actually producing electricity from renewable resources or by buying credits
from generators with excess credits. See id. A bill proposed by Rep. Edward Markey (D-Mass.)
encourages the use of renewable energy resources by exempting utilities from the mandatory
purchase provisions of PUPRA, discussed supra note 41. See id.
155
 See Maine Gov., Mass. AG Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under Competition, supra note 14,
at 10; Mass. Attorney General A.sk.s Northeast Gore. to Penalize Dirty, Imported Power, supra note 14,
at 1; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7; Mass. Enviro Official Warns, supra note 14;
Mass. Eyeing "Ticket to Play", supra note 5, at 7; Mass. Plan to Oversee, supra note 14, at 7.
154
 See Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Goys. to Penalize Dirty, Imported Power, supra note
14, at I; Mass, Calls fin- Northeast to Unite, supra note 7; Mass. Enviro Official YVarns, supra note
14; Mass. Eyeing "Ticket to Play," supra note 5, at 7; Massachusetts Might Condition Market
Participation on Emissions Standards, N.E. POWER REP., Nov. 8,1996, at 2; Generation Performance
Standards for All Electricity Suppliers, supra note 9, at 1 -3.
155 See Allen, supra note 6, at B1; Maine Gov., Mass. AG Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under
Competition, supra note 14, at 10; Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Goys. to Penalize Dirty,
Imported Power, supra note 14, at 1; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7; Mass. Plan
to Oversee, supra mite 14, at 7.
156
 See Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Goys. to Penalize. Dirty, Imported Power, supra note
14, at 1; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7; Mass. Enviro Official Warns, supra note
14; Massachusetts Might Condition Market Participation on Emissions Standards, supra note 154,
at 2.
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improve their pollution controls.'" The plan intends to level the com-
petitive playing field between electricity producers in the Midwest and
Northeast and to protect the environment and the public health of the
region.'"
First, the commissioner urged the Midwestern utility regulators
to voluntarily compel the dirtiest generators in their states to install
proper, 1980's technology to reduce their pollution emissions.''`' He
suggested that the Midwestern utility regulators could impose a non-
bypassable wire charge on the dirtiest generators in their states, and
use the funds generated to finance the new pollution controls.'"" This
approach would serve to protect the environment and would decrease
the Midwestern coal-fired units' competitive advantage without a pro-
tracted legal fight.' 61
If the Midwestern utility regulators do not respond to this appeal,
which is likely, the MDEP plan contains provisions to force the Mid-
western electricity producers to bear the burden of the cost of the
pollution that they create.'" 2 Because the MDEP recognized that the
Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution would forbid an
outright ban on the importation of electricity, it proposed a "genera-
tion performance standard" that it characterized as a "ticket to play"
approach." The ticket to play plan would require all power generators,
both in-state and out-of-state, to meet minimum environmental per-
formance standards before they could sell power in the state.'"' Al-
though the MDEP did not propose specific standards, it suggested that
it may be based on the tons of pollution generated per megawatt hour
("MWh").' 65 The MDEP also suggested that the standard probably
157 See Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Goys. to Penalize Dirty, Imported Power, supra note
14, at 1; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7; Mass. Enviro Official Warns, supra note 14.
158 See. Mass. Calls far Northeast to Unite, ,supra note 7; Mass, Enviro Official Warns, supra note
14; Massachusetts Might Condition Market Participation on Emissions Standards, supra note 154,
at 2; Generation Performance Standards forAtl Electricity Suppliers, supra note 9, at 1 -3.
I" See Mass. Enviro Official Warns, supra note 14.
I"" See Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Coos. to Penalize Dirty, Imported Power, supra note
14, at I.
1111 See id.
1112 See Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Goys. to Penalize. Dirty, Imported Power, supra note
14, at 1; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7; Mass. Enviro Official Warns„ supra note 14.
I" See Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Goys. to Penalize Dirty, Imported Power, supra note
14, at 1; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7; Mass. Enviro Official Warns, supra note
14; Mass. Eyeing "Ticket to Play," supra note 5, at 7; Massachusetts Might Condition Market
Participation on Emissions Standards, supra note 154, at 2.
11,4 See Mass. Enviro Official Warns, supra note 14; Massachusetts Might Condition Market
Participation on Emissions Standards, supra note 154, at 2; Generation Performance Standards ,for
All Electricity Suppliers, supra note 9, at 2-3.
1115
 See Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Govs. to Penalize Dirty, Imported Power, supra note
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would be comparable to the existing emissions profiles of Massachu-
setts utilities. 166
 The MDEP further indicated that the standard likely
will apply to each producer's entire generation portfolio, rather than
to each specific generating unit.' 67
If the ticket to play approach does not pass constitutional muster,
the Commissioner stated that the MDEP will find a way to impose an
environmental and public health surcharge on the electricity that
Midwestern generators sell to Massachusetts, to pay for the damage
caused by the increased pollution.' 68
 The Commissioner indicated that
half of the money collected from the surcharge would be used to fund
the installation of environmental controls on the dirty generators in
the Midwest.'" The other half of the funds would be used to pay for
the environmental, societal and health damages that the electricity
production in the Midwest causes in Massachusetts.'"
B. The Massachusetts Attorney General's "Clean Air Compact"
Massachusetts Attorney General Scott Harshbarger has also sought
a way to force Midwestern coal-fired facilities to reduce emissions
before they are allowed to enter the retail market in Massachusetts."'
On December 2, 1996, Harshbarger circulated a proposal to the twelve
Northeastern governors asking them to form a clean air compact. 172
Harshbarger wants the Northeastern states to work together to limit or
refuse the importation of electricity from states that permit "dirty"
power plants to operate.'"
14, at 1; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7; Generation Performance Standards for All
Electricity Suppliers, supra note 9, at 2.
166 See Mass. Eyeing "Ticket to Play," supra note 5, at 7.
167
 See id. at 7; Generation Performance Standards for All Electricity Suppliers, supra note 9, at 2.
166
 See Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Goes. to Penalize Dirty, Imported Power, supra note
14, at 1; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7; Mass. Enviro Official Warns, supra note 14,
169
 See Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Goys. to Penalize Dirty, Imported Power, supra note
14; Mass, Calls far Northeast to Unite, supra note 7, at 1; Mass. Enviro Official Warns, supra note 14.
17" See Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Govs. to Penalize Dirty, Imported Power, supra tune
14, at 1; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7; Mass. Enviro Official Warns, supra note 14.
171 See Allen, supra note 6, at 131; Maine Gov, Mass. AG Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under
Competition, supra note 14, at 10; Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Guys. to Penalize Dirty,
Imported Power, supra note 14, at 1; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7; Mass. Plan
to Oversee, supra note 14, at 7.
172 See Allen, supra note 6, at Bl; Maine Gov., Mass. AG Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under
Competition, supra note 14, at 10; Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Goys. to Penalize Dirty,
Imported Power, supra note 14, at 1; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7.
173 See Allen, supra note 6, at Bl; Maine Gov., Mass. AG Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under
Competition, supra note 14, at 10; Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Gays. to Penalize Dirty,
Imported Power, ,supra note 14, at 1; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7.
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The Massachusetts Attorney General suggested that the clean air
compact should ban all importation of electricity from states where the
power producers are not subjected to environmental standards that are
comparable to the standards imposed on Northeastern electricity pro-
ducers.'" This would effectively ban the importation of electricity from
all Midwestern electricity producers because their host states have far
less stringent environmental standards.'" Harshbarger also offered a
more moderate plan in case this more extreme proposal is not accept-
able.' 76 Under this plan, the clean air compact would set an environ-
mental standard for emissions on all generators of electricity and
would impose a surcharge on sales of electricity produced by non-com-
plying generators.'" Although Harshbarger admitted that the propos-
als may be found to violate the Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution, he suggests that the plan could receive immunity from
the Commerce Clause if it receives the blessing of Congress.' 78
VI, COMMERCE CLAUSE LIMITATIONS ON ENVIRONMENTAL
AND COMPETITIVE PROTECTIONISM
The Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate com-
merce among the states. 179
 Many subjects of interstate trade that could
potentially be subject to federal regulation inevitably escape congres-
sional attention due to their local character and overwhelming num-
ber.'" Where Congress fails to act, the states have the authority to
regulate matters of legitimate local concern, such as the health and
safety of its citizens.'s' The Commerce Clause, however, limits the
174 See Allen, supra note 6, at 81; Maine Grata , Mass. AG Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under
Competition, supra note 14, at 10; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7; Mass, Plan to
Oversee, supra note 14, at 7.
175 See Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7; Rosen, supra note 5, at 15 n.13.
176 See Mass. Calls- for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7.
177 See Allen, supra note 6, at Bl; Maine Gov., Mass. AG Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under
Competition, supra note 14, at 10; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7.
178
 See Maine Con, Mass, AG Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under Competition, supra note 14,
at 10; Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Goys. to Penalize Dirty, Imported Power„supra note
14, at 1.
179 See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Commerce Clause grants Congress the power "[do
regulate Commerce with fbreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes." Id. The Framers granted Congress power over interstate commerce in "the conviction
that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic
Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the States under
the Articles of Confederation. -
 Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Emil. Quality, 511 U.S.
93, 98 (1994) (quoting Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-326 (1979)); see generally I'm:
FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madison).
18" See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623 (1978).
181 See id. at 623-24.
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states' ability to burden the flow of interstate commerce. 182 In analyzing
the constitutionality of state regulation of interstate commerce, the
United States Supreme Court applies heightened scrutiny to regula-
tion that facially discriminates against articles of interstate trade.'" The
Court invalidates state regulation that discriminates against articles of
interstate trade, either on its face or in its plain effect, unless the
regulation advances a legitimate local purpose that could not be ade-
quately served by nondiscriminatory alternatives.' 84 On the other hand,
the Court applies a much more flexible approach to state regulation
that does not patently discriminate against interstate trade.' Where a
state regulates evenhandedly to further a legitimate local interest,
imposing only incidental effects on interstate commerce, the Court will
uphold the regulation unless the burden imposed on interstate com-
merce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits."
This section examines both how the Court determines the appropriate
level of scrutiny and how the Court applies the two tests to state
regulation.
A. The Court's Heightened Scrutiny of Facially Discriminatory
Regulation of Interstate Commerce
In 1978, in the landmark decision City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
the United States Supreme Court held that a New Jersey statute that
prohibited the importation of most solid or liquid waste violated the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution because it facially discriminated
against out-of-state commerce for no reason other than its origin. 187 In
City of Philadelphia, the New Jersey State Legislature enacted a statute,
which effectively closed its borders to all categories of waste. 188 The New
Jersey legislature stated that the purpose of the ban was to protect the
182 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 98; Maine v. Taylor. 477 U.S. 131, 137 (1986); Minnesota v.
Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 470-71 (1981).
185
 See irfrrr notes 187-221 and accompanying text.
1 " See id.
185 See infra notes 221-47 and -accompanying text.
181 ' See id.
187 437 U.S. at 628-29.
188 Id. at 618-019. The statute blocked the importation of all categories of waste, unless
specifically excepted by the Commissioner of Environmental Protection. See id. at 619. The
Commissioner promulgated regulations that provided four categories of exceptions that gave
economic benefits to New Jersey commercial interests: garbage to he fed to New Jersey swine;
separated waste material appropriate for and intended for a recycling or reclamation fitcility;
municipal solid waste to be processed and used as fuel or heat; and pesticides, hazardous waste
and chemicals to he processed or recovered at a registered solid waste disposal facility. See id.
& n.2.
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public health, safety and welfare of its citizens.'" The ban on waste im-
portation, however, negatively impacted operators of private landfills
in New Jersey and the cities in other states that had agreements for
waste disposal within New Jersey.'`-"' The opponents of the statute con-
tended that the ban was merely an attempt to suppress competition
and to stabilize the cost of solid waste disposal for New Jersey resi-
dents.'" 1
The Court concluded that, regardless of the legislative purpose,
the ban on out-of-state waste violated the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution. 12 The Court recognized that a state may enact legislation
that places incidental burdens on interstate commerce in order to
safeguard the health and safety of its citizens.'" The Court, however,
noting that it was alert, to the evils of economic isolation, applied a
virtual per se rule of invalidity to state legislation that amounts to
simple economic protectionism.'• 4
 The Court concluded that a state
may discriminate against articles of commerce from other states only
where there is some reason, apart from its origin, to treat the out-of-
state commerce differently, 195
In City of Philadelphia, the Court concluded that both on its face
and in its plain effect the New Jersey statute violated the principle of
nondiscrimination."' The Court also reasoned that there was no basis
for treating out-of-state waste differently than domestic waste, since one
was not inherently more harmful than the other. ) `/7 The Court further
reasoned that it was impermissible for one state to attempt to isolate
itself from a common problem by erecting a barrier to interstate
trade. 198 Thus, the Court held that the New Jersey legislation was clearly
impermissible under the Commerce Clause because it facially discrimi-
1 " See id. at 625.
See id. at 619.
191 See id. at 625-26.
l'j2 City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27. The Court reasoned that, "[t] his dispute about
ultimate legislative purpose need /14)t he resolved, because ... the evil of protectionism can reside
in legislative means as well as legislative ends." Id. at 626.
"See id. at 623-24.
19 '1 Id. at. 624. The Court stated that, "[t] he crucial inquiry, thereibre, must be directed
determining whether ch. 363 is basically a protectionist measure, or whether it. can fairly be viewed
as a law directed to legitimate local concerns, with effects upon interstate commerce that are only
incidental." Id.
195 Id. 626-27.
"6 Id. at 627. The Court reasoned that, "On its face, it imposes on out-of-state commercial
interests the full burden of conserving the State's remaining landfill space." Id. at 628.
' 97 See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 629.
"See id. at 628.
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nated against an article of interstate commerce for no other reason
than its origin. ] °`'
In Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality
of Oregon, a similar case decided in 1994, the United States Supreme
Court held that Oregon's surcharge on the in-state disposal of solid
waste generated in other states violated the Commerce Clause because
the surcharge facially discriminated against interstate commerce, and
the state was unable to show a legitimate local purpose which could
not have been adequately served by nondiscriminatory alternatives. 200
In 1989, Oregon imposed a $2.25 per ton surcharge on all out-of-state
waste disposed of at in-state facilities. 201 Although an $.85 per ton fee
also was imposed on the disposal of waste generated in Oregon, the
operator of a solid waste landfill in Oregon challenged the rule under
the Commerce Clause. 202
The Court indicated that the first step in analyzing a law under
the Commerce Clause was to determine if the law discriminated against
interstate commerce or if it merely regulated evenhandedly with only
incidental effects on interstate commerce. 20a Because the Court deter-
mined that it was obvious that the $2.25 per ton surcharge on out-of-
state waste was discriminatory on its face, the Court reasoned that the
application of the virtual per se rule of invalidity was appropriate. 2°1
Under the heightened scrutiny test, the Court declared that it would
invalidate the surcharge unless the state could show that it advanced
a legitimate local concern that could not be adequately served by
nondiscriminatory alternatives. 205 The Court concluded that the state
did not show that the surcharge advanced such a legitimate local
concern."6 '. • 'imat ter, the Court concluded that Oregon's surcharge con-
199 Id. at 628-29.
2041511 13.5. 93,108 (1994).
201 See id. at 96.
202 See id. at 97.
205 See id. at 99. The Court stated that "discrimination" simply means differential treatment
of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter. Id.
7" See id. at 100.
"5 Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 100-01.
7)6 Id. at 101-07. The Court noted that Oregon neither claimed that the disposal of out-ui-
state waste imposed higher costs on the state than did the disposal of in-state waste, nor that
out-of-state waste posed any unique safety or health concerns that would legitimize the surcharge.
See id. at 101. The Court rejected Oregon's contention that the surcharge was a "compensatory
tax" that simply made the shippers of out-of-state waste pay their fair share of the cost of disposing
of out-of-state waste. See id. at 102. The Court also rejected Oregon's claim that the surcharge
was intended to prevent Oregon citizens from bearing the costs of disposing of out-of-state waste.
See Id. at 105-06.
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stituted economic protectionism. 207 Thus, the Court invalidated the
surcharge because it facially discriminated against interstate commerce
based only on its origin, and because the state was unable to show the
advancement of a legitimate local concern. 208
Conversely, in 1986, in Maine v. Taylor, the United States Supreme
Court upheld a Maine statute that prohibited the importation of live
baitfish because it determined that it was enacted to serve a legitimate
local purpose that could not be served adequately by available nondis-
criminatory alternatives. 2"" In Taylor, the state contended that it en-
acted the ban to protect the state's unique and fragile fisheries from
parasites and nonnative species that might have been contained in the
shipments of live baitfish. 2" An operator of a bait business in Maine,
who was indicted for arranging to import 158,000 five baitfish in
violation of the ban, moved to dismiss the indictment claiming that it
unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce)'
The Court in Taylor recognized that the challenged statute re-
stricted interstate trade in the most direct manner possible, by blocking
all incoming shipments of baitfish at the border, 212 Thus, because the
import ban discriminated on its face, the Court subjected the statute
to the heightened scrutiny test. 2 n In applying the heightened scrutiny
test, the Court stated that it would hold the statute unconstitutional
unless it served a legitimate local purpose that could not be served as
well by available nondiscriminatory means. 2 " The Court, however, con-
cluded that Maine had a legitimate interest in protecting against the
potential risks imposed on the state's aquatic ecology by the inadver-
tent importation of parasites and nonnative species, 2 " In analyzing the
second part of the heightened scrutiny test, the Court noted that scien-
tifically accepted techniques for sampling and inspecting live baitfish
for parasites and nonnative species did not exist. 216
207 /d. at 106.
208 Id. at 108.
2f12 477 U.S. 131, 151-52 (1986).
210 /d. at 133.
212 See id. at 132.
212 See id. at 137.
213 Id. at 138.
219 Tay lor, 477 U.S. at 138, 140,
215 /d. at 140-41, 148. Thus, Maine may he distinguished from City of Philadelphia because
Maine discriminated against imported baitfish for reasons other than origin. See id.; City of
Philadelphia v, New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627, 629 (1978).
216 s„ 7uylur, 477 U.S. at 146-47. The Court further noted that a state "is not required to
develop new and unproven means of protection at an uncertain cost." Id. at 147.
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In upholding the constitutionality of the ban on live baitfish, the
Court emphasized the distinction between state legislation enacted to
protect in-state economic interests and legislation enacted to further
legitimate local concerns. 217 As in City of Philadelphia, the Court recog-
nized that statutes that amounted to "simple economic protectionism"
have been subjected to a "virtual per se rule of invalidity." 218 The Court
in Taylor, however, stated that the Commerce Clause does not elevate
the protection of free trade above all other concerns. 219 The Court
concluded that so long as a state does not needlessly obstruct interstate
commerce or attempt to protect its in-state economic interests, "it
retains broad regulatory authority to protect the health and safety of
its citizens and the integrity of its natural resources." 22" Thus, the
Supreme Court in 'Taylor held that the ban on the importation of live
baitfish was constitutionally valid because it served a legitimate local
purpose that could not have been served as well by available nondis-
criminatory alternatives. 22 '
B. The Court's Treatment of Facially Neutral Regulation that Imposes
an Incidental Burden on Interstate Commerce
In 1970, in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., the United States Supreme
Court used a balancing test to invalidate a nondiscriminatory Arizona
act that regulated the packaging of cantaloupes because the burdens
that it imposed on interstate commerce were clearly excessive in rela-
tion to the local benefits that it provided. 222 Arizona's stated purpose
in passing the act was to promote and preserve the reputation of
Arizona growers by prohibiting the shipment of inferior or deceptively
packaged produce. 228 The act was used to prohibit a company from
transporting uncrated cantaloupes from the company's ranch in Ari-
zona to a nearby facility in California for processing and packaging.224
Because the company had no other facility nearby in Arizona, the
217 See id. at 148, 151.
218 See id. at 148 (quoting City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624).
219 /d. at 151.
sea Id.
" 1 Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151.
222 397 U.S. 137, 142, 145-46 (1970). The Arizona act required all cantaloupes grown in the
state and offered for sale to he packaged in approved, closed containers. See id. at 132.
22' See id. at 143.
224 See id. at 138-39. !tonically, the Court noted that the plaintiff in Pike grew cantaloupes of
exceptionally high quality See id. at 144. Therefore, the state was attempting to ensure that the
packaging on the high quality cantaloupes indicated that they were grown in Arizona, thus
improving the reputation of Arizona growers. See id.
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parties stipulated to the fact that the practical effect of the prohibition
was to compel the company to build packing shed facilities in Ari-
zona,22' The new facility would have cost $200,000 and would have
taken many months to construct. 226
 The resulting delay would have led
to the loss of the company's 1968 cantaloupe crop. 227 The company,
therefore, challenged the constitutionality of the act. 22"
In analyzing the constitutionality of the act, the Court applied a
balancing test rather than the more rigid, heightened scrutiny test. 229
The Court reasoned that the balancing test was appropriate for non-
discriminatory regulation enacted to further legitimate local concerns
that impose incidental effects on interstate commerce: 23" The Court
stated that it would uphold such legislation unless the burdens that it
imposed upon interstate commerce were clearly excessive in relation
to the local benefits. 23 ' In Pike, the Court concluded that the state's
interest in promoting the reputation of its growers could not constitu-
tionally justify requiring the plaintiff to construct a $200,000 packing
plant in the state. 232 Thus, the Court held that a nondiscriminatory act
that nonetheless imposed incidental burdens on interstate commerce
was unconstitutional because the burdens on interstate commerce
were clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits. 233
Conversely, in 1981, in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., the
United States Supreme Court held that a Minnesota statute banning
the retail sale of plastic, nonreturnable milk containers did not violate
the Commerce Clause under the balancing test formulated in Pike. 231
The Minnesota Legislature enacted the statute to promote resource
and energy conservation and to ease the state's solid waste disposal
problems by encouraging the use of environmentally superior contain-
225 See id, at 140.
226 See id. at 13910.
227 See Pike, 397 U.S. at 139. The company estimated that it would have lost $700,000. See id.
228 See id. at 138.
229 /d. at 142.
299 See id. at 142. The Court stated that, °[w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to
effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits." Id.
231 Id. In balancing the local purpose against the burden that it imposed upon interstate
commerce, the Court indicated that it would consider the nature of the local interest and whether
it could be promoted by less burdensome means. See id.
232 397 U.S. at 145.
2" Id. at 142, 145.
234 449 U.S. 450, 474 (1981). The Minnesota statute fOrbade the sale or milk and fluid milk
products in non-returnable, nonrefillable rigid or semirigid containers composed or at least 50%
plastic. See id. at 459.
840	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 38:811
ers. 235 Numerous Minnesota and non-Minnesota companies involved in
various segments of the dairy industry challenged the statute under
the Commerce Clause."6
In Clover Leaf the Court noted that the Commerce Clause limits
state legislation even in areas of legitimate local concern, such as
environmental protection and resource management.237 The Court
further indicated that the balancing test established in Pike was appro-
priate for scrutinizing the Minnesota statute because it regulated even-
handedly by prohibiting all milk retailers from selling milk in plastic,
nonreturnable containers, regardless of origin. 238 In applying the Pike
balancing test, the Court concluded that the ban on plastic, nonre-
turnable containers was valid because the burden that it imposed on
interstate commerce was not clearly excessive in relation to the local
benefits."' The Court reasoned that the ban imposed relatively minor
burdens on interstate commerce because milk products in all other
containers could still move freely across Minnesota's border and be-
cause most dairies would suffer only a slight inconvenience because
they already packaged their products in several different types of con-
tainers.241)
The Court reached this conclusion despite evidence that plastic
resin used in the banned containers was produced entirely out-of-state,
and that pulpwood used to manufacture paperboard containers was a
major Minnesota product. 24 ' The Court reasoned that although pulp-
wood producers in Minnesota were likely to benefit from the statute,
plastics would continue to be used in the production of plastic pouches,
returnable bottles and paperboard itself. 242 In addition, out-of-state
producers of pulpwood would likely absorb some of the business gen-
erated by the act. 243 The Court further determined that even if the ban
233 See id. at 459,466,468-69. The State contended that the plastic containers required more
energy to produce and took up more space in landfills than other nonreturnable milk containers.
See id. at 468-69. The statute was intended to buy time in order to further develop and promote
environmentally preferable alternatives, such as refillable plastic bottles and plastic pouches,
before the rigid, non-returnable plastic containers became entrenched in the market. See id. at
459-60,465. The State contended that it permitted the continued use of paperboard containers
because they were less popular than the plastic container, and thus would not provide as much
competition during the transition to environmentally superior containers. See id. at 465.
236 See id. at 458 & n.l.
237 See id. at 471.
23" id. at 471-72.
2" Clover Leaf, 449 U.S. at 472-73.
24"See id. at 472.
241 See id. at 473.
242 See id.
243 See id. at 473.
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on nonreusable, plastic containers placed a heavier burden on out-of-
state industry, the burden was not clearly excessive in comparison to
the state's legitimate interest in conserving energy and natural re-
sources and in solving its waste disposal problems. 244
 The Court stated
that it would not invalidate a nondiscriminatory statute that served a
legitimate state purpose simply because it caused some business to shift
from a predominantly out-of-state industry to a predominantly in-state
industry. 2" Additionally, under the final prong of the Pike balancing
test, the Court concluded that the local benefits provided by the ban
could not have been effectuated by an approach with less of an impact
on interstate commerce.2" Thus, the Court held that the Minnesota
ban on the retail sale of milk products in nonreturnable, plastic con-
tainers was valid under the Commerce Clause because it regulated
evenhandedly without excessively burdening interstate commerce in
relation to the local benefits served and because no adequate nondis-
criminatory alternatives existed. 247
VII. ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS PROPOSALS
If implemented, any of Massachusetts' proposals to ban or limit
the importation of electricity generated by high emission facilities
would almost certainly face constitutional challenge under the Com-
merce Clause by affected out-of-state producers. 248
 In order to ascertain
if the United States Supreme Court would uphold the various Massa-
chusetts proposals discussed above, it is essential to determine whether
the Court would apply the heightened scrutiny test formulated in City
of Philadelphia or the more flexible balancing test outlined in Pike and
its progen y. 219
 This section will examine each proposal to determine
the appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny and will consider the
likelihood of their passing constitutional muster. 25°
249 Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 473.
245
 Id. at 474.
246 Id. at 473-74.
247 Id. at 474.
248
 See Mass, Plan to Oversee, supra note 14, at 7.
240 See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envt.'1 Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1994);
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 137-38, 140 (1986); Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 471-72, 474; City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623-24, 629 (1978); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137, 142 (1970).
250 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 100-01; Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137-38, 140; Clover Leaf 449 U.S.
at 471-72, 474; City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 623-24, 629; Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
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A. Constitutional Analysis of the Attorney General's Proposals: The
Outright Ban and the Performance-Based Surcharge
The Court would almost certainly invalidate the Attorney Gen-
eral's proposed ban on the importation of power from states that do
not subject their electricity producers to environmental standards com-
parable to those imposed on Northeastern producers. 25 ' Although the
proposed ban would advance the legitimate local concerns of protect-
ing the health and the environment of Massachusetts from the delete-
rious effects of Midwestern generated pollution, as discussed above, it
most likely would be subjected to the rigorous heightened scrutiny
test. 252 The proposed ban is an especially appropriate target for height-
ened scrutiny analysis because it blatantly discriminates against an
article of interstate commerce based on its origin. 255 There is no reason
to treat the end product, electricity, differently because electrons gen-
erated out-of-state are indistinguishable from domestically produced
electrons. 25 t Massachusetts could argue, however, that even though
foreign and domestic electrons themselves are identical, the fact that
different methods of production are used in the generation process
justifies the discriminatory treatment:255 Although this argument po-
tentially could persuade the Court that the ban was imposed for a
legitimate reason other than mere origin, the ban would significantly
burden interstate commerce in its practical effect:256 This is apparent
due to the fact that the proposed ban would prohibit all electricity
producers in non-complying states, even renewable energy producers
such as solar and wind that emit no pollution, from selling power to
251 See Allen, supra note 6, at B1; Maine Gm, Mass. AG Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under
Competition, supra note 14, at 10; Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Goys. to Penalize Dirty,
Imported Power, supra note 14, at 1; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7.
21'2 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 100-01; Thylor, 477 U.S. at 137-88, 140; City of Philadelphia,
437 U.S. at 623-25; Maine Gm., Mass. AG Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under Competition, salmi
note 14, at 10; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7.
253 See Oregon Waste Sys., 511 U.S. at 100; Taylor, 477 U.S. at 137-38, 148; City of Philadelphia,
437 U.S. at 626-27, 629; Allen, supra note 6, at Hi; Maine GM , Mass. AG Urge Northeast to Protect
Air Under Competition, supra note 14, at 10; Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Goys, to Penalize
Dirty, Imported Power, supra note 14, at 1; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7.
254 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S at 101; City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27, 629; Maine
Gov., Mass. AG Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under Competition, supra note 14, at 10; Mass. Attorney
General Asks Northeast Gnus. to Penalize Dirty, Imported Power, supra note 19, at 1; Mass. Calls for
Northeast to Unite, supra note 7.
255 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 101; City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27, 629.
256 See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138; City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627; Allen, supra note 6, at Bl;
Maine Gam, Mass. AG Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under Competition, supra note 14, at 10; Mass.
Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7.
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Massachusetts residents. 257
 The proposed ban also fails under the third
prong of the heightened scrutiny test since numerous, less discrimina-
tory alternatives are available to the Commonwealth. 258
 The Attorney
General's own surcharge proposal and the more moderate proposals
suggested by the MDEP, which would either ban or place a surcharge
on all electricity, regardless of origin, that did not meet generation
performance standards, reveals this fitct. 25" Thus, as Attorney General
Harshbarger indicated, the proposed ban would be allowed only if
Congress explicitly delegated Massachusetts the authority to erect the
ban because the ban facially discriminates against interstate commerce
and less discriminatory alternatives could be implemented to address
the problem."*
The Supreme Court would be more inclined to uphold the Attor-
ney General's more moderate proposal to impose a surcharge on sales
of electricity that do not comply with environmental standards for
emissions. 28 ' This proposal could escape heightened scrutiny if it is
applied to both in-state and out-of-state producers. 262
 Depending on
the basis for the emissions standard employed, it is possible that the
Court could find the practical effect of the surcharge is to discriminate
against interstate commerce:26s For example, the emissions standard
could be set at a level that exempts all or most of Massachusetts'
generators from the surcharge, yet imposes the surcharge on a sig-
nificant percentage of out-of-state producers. This would appear to be
257
 See City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627; Allen, supra note 6, at EH; Maine Coy., Mass. AC
Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under Competition, supra note 14, at 10; Mass. Calls for Northeast to
Unite, supra mite 7.
'258
 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 100-01; "Taylor, 477 U.S. at. 138, 140, 146
-47, 151; Maine
Gnu., Mass. AG Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under Competition, supra note 14, at 10; Mass. Calls
for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7; Massachusetts Might Condition Market Participation on Emis-
sions Standards, supra note 154, at 2.
259
 See Maine Gov., Mass. AG Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under Competition, supra note 14,
at 10; Mass. Calls firr Northeast to Unite, supra mite 7.
2" See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 1 00-01, 1355; Traylor', 477 U.S. at 139-40; Maine Gnu, Mass.
AG Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under Competition, supra note 14, at l0; Mass. Attorney General
Asks Northeast Cons, to Penalize Dirty, Imported Power, supra note l4, at 1.
21,1 See Maine Gov., Mass. AG Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under Competition, supra note 14,
at 10; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7.
2112 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99; Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138, 151-52; Minnesota v. Clover Leaf
Creamery Go., 449 U.S. 456, 471-72 (1981); City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624; Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). It is unclear whether or not the surcharge will he assessed
against Massachusetts generating facilities that do not comply with the standards for emissiotts.
See Maine Coy., Mass. AC Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under Competition, supra note 14, :it 10;
Mass. Calls JrO Northeast to Unite, supra note 7.
265 See Mylor, 477 U.S, at 138; City of Philadelphia, 497 U.S. at 627; Maine Gnu, Mass, AG
Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under Competition, supra note 14, at 10; Mass. Calls for Northeast to
Unite, supra note 7.
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the type of economic protectionism that the Court is especially vigilant
in striking down.264
If the Court concludes that the surcharge is merely economic
protectionism, it would then need to determine if Massachusetts was
justified in discriminating against foreign electricity for a legitimate
purpose other than origin:2" As discussed above, Massachusetts could
argue that although the final product is identical regardless of its
origin, discrimination against methods of production that emit high
levels of pollution is justified because of health and environmental
concerns. 266 Even if the Court accepts this justification for the discrimi-
natory treatment of out-of-state producers, it would invalidate the
surcharge if it determines that a nondiscriminatory alternative exists:267
For example, the Court could determine that a general surcharge on
all electricity would reduce Massachusetts' consumption of electricity,
alleviating the health and environmental problems caused by electric-
ity generation:26s Thus, it is unlikely that the proposed surcharge would
survive the rigid requirements of the heightened scrutiny t est2®
If, on the other hand, the Court determines that the surcharge
neither facially discriminates against interstate commerce nor discrimi-
nates in practical effect, it would apply the balancing test outlined in
Pike. 27° The Court would balance the local benefits of the surcharge
with the incidental burden that it imposes on interstate commerce:27 i
It is difficult to speculate about the result of the balancing test because
Attorney General Harshbarger did not indicate the amount of the
proposed surcharge. 272 If Massachusetts sets the surcharge at an arbi-
trary rate that greatly exceeds the damage that is actually caused by
264 See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138, 148; Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 471; City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S.
at 623-24, 627.
265 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 100-01, 108; "Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138, 140, 151-52; City of
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626-27, 629.
266 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 101, 108; Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151-52; City of Philadelphia, 437
U.S. at 626-27, 629.
267 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 100-01; Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138, 140, 146-47, 151.
268 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 100-01; Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138, 140, 146-47, 151; City of
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626.
2°9 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 100-01, 109; Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138, 140, 151-52.
27° See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99; Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138; Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 471-72;
City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624; Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142, 145-46 (1970);
Maine Gov., Mass. AG Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under Competition, supra note 14, at 10; Mass.
Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7.
271 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99; Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138; Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 471-74;
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142, 145-146.
272 See Allen, supra note 6, at 131; Maine Gov., Mass. AG Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under
Competition, supra note 14, at 10; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, ,supra note 7.
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the pollution emitted by the non-complying facility, the Court would
likely hold that the local benefits do not justify the burden imposed
on interstate commerce. 273
 If the surcharge rate is calculated based
upon the amount of damage caused in Massachusetts by pollution
produced in non-complying electricity facilities, however, the Court
likely would hold that the burdens imposed on interstate commerce
were not clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits. 274
As the Court noted in Clover Leaf the Court would not necessarily
invalidate the surcharge even if it imposes a relatively heavier burden
on out-of-state electricity producers than on in-state producers. 273 The
Court will not invalidate a nondiscriminatory statute that serves a
legitimate local purpose merely because it causes some business to shift
from out-of-state industry to in-state industry. 27" Massachusetts, there-
fore, may be allowed to set the emissions standard at a level comparable
to the current emissions profiles of most in-state generators. 277 Because
Massachusetts electricity producers already are subjected to relatively
strict emissions standards, setting the emissions standards at this level
still would be justified as benefiting health and the environment. 278 The
surcharge would be more likely to withstand an attack under the
Commerce Clause if the emissions standard is set at. a level that forces
some in-state electricity producers to pay the surcharge. 2" If the pro-
posed surcharge does not discriminate on its face or in its practical
effect and it furthers a legitimate local concern that is not clearly
excessive in relation to the burdens imposed on interstate commerce,
the Court will treat the regulation with significant deference:2 "0 The
Court would not necessarily invalidate the surcharge even if it deter-
mines that Massachusetts could implement an approach with less of an
impact on interstate commerce. 28 ' As the Court indicated in Pike, the
existence of less burdensome means is not determinative, but, rather,
273
 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99; 'Taylor, 477 U,S. at 138; Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 471-74;
Pike, 397 U.S. at 142, 145-46; Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Goes. to Penalize Dirty, Imported
Power, supra note 14, at 1.
274 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99; Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138; Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 471-72;
Pike 397 U.S. at 142, 145-46.
275 See Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 473-74.
276 See id. at. 474.
277 See id. at 473-74.
278
 See id.; Rosen, .supra note 5, at 15 n.13.
279 See Clover Leaf, 449 U.S. at 473.
280 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986); Clover Leaf, 449 U.S. at 471-74; Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137,142,145-40 ( 1970 ).
281
 See Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 471, 473; Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
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is one factor considered in balancing the local purpose against the
burdens imposed on interstate commerce. 282
B. Analysis of the MDEP's Ticket to Play Proposal
Due to the similarities between the MDEP's ticket to play proposal
and the Attorney General's surcharge proposal, the United States
Supreme Court most likely would apply similar constitutional analy-
sis.'" The ticket to play proposal would probably not be subjected to
heightened scrutiny analysis because it will be facially neutral, applying
the same generation performance standard to all power generators
regardless of their origin. 284
 If the MDEP follows through with it's
indication that the standard will be comparable to the existing emis-
sions profiles of Massachusetts utilities, however, the Court might hold
that the proposal discriminates against interstate commerce in practi-
cal effect.285
 As discussed in the analysis of the Attorney General's
surcharge proposal, Massachusetts would appear to be effectuating
economic protectionism if most of the in-state facilities already comply
with the standard while a significant percentage of out-of-state facilities
do not."" If this proves to be the case, the ticket to play proposal would
be subject to the rigorous heightened scrutiny test. 287
The ticket to play proposal most likely would not stand up to the
heightened scrutiny test. 288 The proposal would pass the first prong of
the test because it advances legitimate local concerns by mitigating the
effects of the vicious cycle discussed in Section WI above, which could
potentially result in deleterious effects on the health of Massachusetts'
282
 See Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 471, 473; Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
283
 See generally Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Goys. to Penalize Dirty, Imparted Power,
supra note 14, at 1; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7; Mass. Enviro Official Warns,
supra note 14; Massachusetts Might Condition Market Participation on Emissions Standards, supra
note 154, at 2.
284 See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, Sit U.S. 93, 99-101 (1994);
Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138; Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 472; City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey; 437 U.S.
617, 623-24, 627 (1978); Pike, U.S. at 142; Mass. Enviro Official Warns, supra note 14; Massachu-
setts Might Condition Market Participation on Emissions Standards, supra note 154, at 2.
285 See Taylor; 477 U.S. at 138; City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627; Mass. Eying "Ticket to
Play", supra note 5, at 7; Massachusetts Might Condition Market Participation on Emissions Stand-
ards, supra note 154, at 2.
286 See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148; City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 623-34, 627-28; Mass. Eyeing
"Ticket to Play", supra note 5, at 7; Massachusetts Might Condition Market Participation on Emissions
Standards, supra note 154, at 2.
287 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99-101; Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148; City of Philadelphia, 43 U.S.
at 623-24, 627-28; Mass. Eying "Ticket to Play," supra note 5, ai 7; Massachusetts Might Condition
Market Participation. on Emissions Standards, supra note 154, at 2.
288 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 100-01, 108; Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138, 140; Mass. Calls for
Northeast to Unite, sutyra note 7; Mass. Enviro Official Warns, supra note 14.
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citizens and the quality of the environment. 289
 Massachusetts also may
persuade the court that the ticket to play program satisfies the second
prong of the test. It does not discriminate merely on the basis of origin
because it. is aimed at the method of production rather than the nature
of the final product.2" The ticket to play proposal, however, almost
certainly would fail the third prong of the heightened scrutiny test. 291
To invalidate the proposal, the Supreme Court merely would have to
determine that a nondiscriminatory alternative was available that could
adequately advance the state's interest. 292 For example, as suggested
above, the Court could conclude that a general surcharge on all elec-
tricity sold in the state would mitigate the deleterious effects of the re-
structuring of the electricity utility industry by decreasing the amount
of electricity purchased. 293 Alternatively, the Court may conclude that
Massachusetts could have established the generation performance stand-
ard based exclusively on careful and thorough considerations of health
and environmental concerns, rather than merely setting it at a level
comparable to the current emissions profiles of Massachusetts utili-
ties. 294
 Thus, due to the almost insurmountable standard imposed by
the heightened scrutiny test, the ticket to play proposal most likely
would not withstand this rigorous analysis. 295
Under the flexible balancing test formulated in Pike, however, the
Supreme Court would likely uphold the MDEP ticket to play pro-
posal:29G As noted above, the ticket to play proposal would advance the
legitimate state concerns of preventing harm to human health and to
the environment by regulating in a facially neutral manner. 2"7 The
MDEP should base the generation performance standards on health
289 .Spe Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 100-01; Traylor, 477 U.S. at 138, 140, 148 n. 19 , 151; City of
Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7; Mass. Enviro Official
Warns, supra note 1.
291-1 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 101; Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151-52; City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S.
at 627, 629.
291 See. Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 100-01; Teylm; 477 U.S. at 138, 140, 146-47, 151.
292
 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 100-01.
293 See ary of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 626.
294 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99-101; Minnesota v. Clover Leaf, 449 U.S. 456, 472, 474
(1981); City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624, 626-27; Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
295 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99-101, 108; 'Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138, 140, 151-52; Mats.
Attorney General Asks Northeast Goys. to Penalize Dirty, Imported Power, supra note 14, at 1; Mass.
Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7; Mass. Enviro Official Warns, supra note 14.
29" See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99; Thylor, 477 U.S. at 138; Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 471
-72;
City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624; Pike, 397 U.S. at 142, 145-46; Mass. Attorney General Asks
Northeast Govs. to Penalize Dirty, Imported Power, .supra note 14, at 1; Mass. Calls for Northeast to
Unite, supra note 7; Mass. Enviro Official Warns, supra note 14.
297
 See Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 471-72, 474; Pike, 397 U.S. at 142
-43; Mass, Enviro Official
Warns, supra note 14; Massachusetts Might Condition Market Participation on Emissions Standards,
supra note 154, at 2.
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and environmental considerations, rather than merely setting the level
based upon the existing emissions profiles of Massachusetts utilities.'"
The Court would be less likely to hold that such a standard, which
presumably would prohibit some Massachusetts generators from sell-
ing electricity while allowing out-of-state generators that comply with
the standard to obtain additional business, discriminated in practical
effect against interstate commerce. 2"9 As indicated in Clover Leaf the
Court will not automatically invalidate the ticket to play proposal even
if it causes some business to shift from in-state interests to out-of-state
interests."° The Court would not invalidate the ticket to play proposal
under the Pike balancing test unless the burdens on interstate com-
merce are clearly excessive in relation to the local benefits furthered."
In light of the substantial state interest in mitigating the deleterious
effects of pollution transported to Massachusetts from the Midwest, the
Court would probably hold that it is sufficient to justify the burdens
imposed on interstate commerce by the ticket to play proposal."'
C. Proposal to Protect the Health and Environment of the Northeast
Without Violating the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution
Both the generation performance standard and the surcharge
based on emissions standards can potentially pass constitutional mus-
ter." To survive a constitutional challenge, Massachusetts must craft
the regulation in a manner that will compel the Court to apply the
flexible, balancing test originated in Pike, rather than the heightened
scrutiny test." Thus, it is essential that the regulation applies even-
handedly to both in-state and out-of-state producers of electricity. 30'
21111 See Mass. Eyeing "'Ticket to Play," supra note 5, at 7; Massachusetts Might Condition Markel
Participation on Emissions Standards, supra note 154, at 2.
299 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99; Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 472-74.
300 See 449 U.S. at 473-74.
501 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99; Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 471-74; Pike, 397 U.S. at 142,
145-46. The availability of less discriminatory alternatives would be considered by the Court as
part of the balancing test. See Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 471, 473; Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
312 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 148 (1986); Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 473; City of
Philadelphia v. New jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978); Pike, 397 U.S. at 142-43, 145-46; Mass.
Attorney General Asks Northeast Goys. to Penalize Dirty, Imported Power, supra note 14, at I; Mass.
Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7; Mass. Enviro Official Warns, .supra note 14.
11111' See generally Maine Gov., Mass. AG Urge Northeast to Protect Air Under Competition, supra
note 14, at 10; Mass. Attorney General Asks Northeast Gems. to Penalize Dirty, Imported Power, supra
note 14, at 1; Mass. Calls for Northeast to Unite, supra note 7; Mass. Enviro Official Warns, supra
note 14.
3" See 397 U.S. at 142, 145-46; see also Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99-101; Taylor, 477 U.S. at
138, 140; Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 471-72; City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 623-24.
3415 See. Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99-100; Tay/or, 477 U.S. at 138, 151-52; Clover Leaf 449 U.S.
at 471 -72; City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624; Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
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This will avoid the appearance that the regulation is merely the type
of economic isolationism that the Court strikes down with impunity. 3°'
To further demonstrate to the Court that the regulation does not
discriminate against interstate commerce in its practical effect, Massa-
chusetts must take great care in determining the acceptable emissions
standard.s°7
 The emissions standard must be based solely upon a care-
ful and thorough study of the effects of increased _pollution on the
health and safety of Massachusetts' citizens and environment." Thus,
the standard should not be set at a level merely because it is compara-
ble to the current emissions profiles of Massachusetts utilities." If the
emissions level is based purely on health and safety criteria, it could
pass constitutional muster even if it incidentally places greater burdens
on out-of-state electricity producers. 3 "'
The Court likely would apply the Pike balancing test to regulations
that follow the suggestions outlined above. 311
 The Court recognizes that
states have a legitimate interest in protecting the health of its citizens
and the quality of its environment."2
 Thus, if the Massachusetts regu-
lation applies evenhandedly to all producers of electricity, regardless
of origin, and merely imposes incidental burdens on interstate com-
merce, the Court would be unlikely to hold the burdens to be clearly
excessive in relation to the local interests. 3 "
Inn. CONCLUSION
The restructuring of the electricity generation industry is rapidly
approaching. In the very near future, all electricity customers may be
permitted to seek out the most attractive retail packages available.
Although it is estimated that consumers could save billions of dollars
annually as a result of the creation of a competitive market for retail
electricity, serious health, environmental and economic dangers loom
on the horizon. As discussed in Section III, the restructuring of the
electric utility industry may result in a vicious cycle that transports
See Taylor, 477 U.S, at 138, 148; Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 471; City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S.
at 623-24, 627.
317 See Taylor, 477 U.S. a 148; City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 627.
3°8
 See Man. Eyeing "Ticket to Play," supra note 5, al 7; Massachusetts Might Condition Market
Participation on Emissions Standards, supra note 154, at 2.
'' See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99-101; Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 472, 474; City of Philadelphia,
437 U.S. at 624, 626-27; Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
310
 See Clover Leaf, 449 U.S. at 473-74.
311
 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99-101; Taylor, 477 U.S. at 138; Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at
471-72; City of Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 624; Pike, 397 U.S. at 142, 145-46.
312 See Taylor, 477 U.S. at 148; Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at 471; Pike, 397 U.S. at 143.
313 See Oregon Waste, 511 U.S. at 99-100; Tayar, 477 U.S. at 138; Clover Leaf 449 U.S. at
471-72; Pike, 397 U.S. at 142, 145-46.
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increasing amounts of pollution to the Northeast as the competitive
advantage of coal-fired electricity generators in the Midwest grows
larger. The end result could be disastrous to the Northeast, placing
human health at risk, deteriorating the environment and making it
impossible for many electricity producers in the region to compete.
Thus, the states in the Northeast have a vested interest in ensuring that
this potential disaster is averted. If the federal government fails to
implement an acceptable solution, the Northeastern states may be
forced to devise their own plans to prevent the realization of their fears
about restructuring. The states must devise their restructuring plans
very carefully, however, to withstand the inevitable Commerce Clause
challenges by affected out-of-state power producers. The Northeastern
states must strive to ensure that their plans regulate evenhandedly
against both in-state and out-of-state producers so they are not sub-
jected to the rigorous, heightened scrutiny constitutional test. Addi-
tionally, the states must make certain that the burdens imposed on
interstate commerce do not unreasonably exceed the legitimate local
benefits to the health of the states' citizens and the environment.
Although the United States Supreme Court likely would invalidate an
outright ban on electricity from certain states, such as the Massachu-
setts Attorney General's proposed ban, under the heightened scrutiny
test, limits based on generation performance standards may survive a
challenge under the Commerce Clause. Thus, if the states in the
Northeast carefully modify the Massachusetts general performance
standards so that they neither discriminate against out-of-state gener-
ators facially or in practical effect and so that the standards employed
are carefully crafted to match the anticipated environmental and health
impacts in Massachusetts, they may succeed in limiting the importation
of dirty power from the Midwest.
JUSTIN M. NESBIT
